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Foundations and the Ambiguity of  
Success and Failure 
A Case Collection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key Findings 
With philanthropic foundations having grown in numbers and significance, 
the question of what makes for the success and failure of their projects and 
activities becomes increasingly relevant. This collection looks at 20 cases 
across a range of foundation fields in seven different countries, including the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Germany. It examines different 
aspects of foundations´ operations: the way in which endowments and 
other resources needed are allocated; the way decisions are reached, 
implemented and managed; the initial results and program interventions 
and projects; and outcomes in terms of the longer-term changes. It becomes 
clear that for foundations operating in complex environments simple 
notions of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ may not be relevant concepts for assessing 
performance at all, rather, foundations frequently face the challenge of 
ambiguity that seems inherent in relation to their chosen roles, e.g., working 
towards uncertain outcomes; starting rather than completing activities 
towards a desired goal; building bridges between otherwise unconnected or 
distrusting constituencies, or creating space for diverse parties to convene or 
discordant voices to be heard. 
 
 
 
The Project “Foundation Successes and Failures: Implications and Lessons for 
Policy and Management – Developing a Case Studies Repertoire” was made 
possible by the Robert Bosch Stiftung. 
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Introduction1 
With philanthropic foundations having grown in numbers and significance 
in most developed market economies, the question of what makes for the 
success and failure of their projects and activities becomes increasingly 
relevant. This collection looks at 20 cases across seven different countries, 
including the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, and from a 
range of fields in which foundations are active, covering both domestic and 
international projects. What is more, they cover different aspects of 
foundations´ operations: the way in which endowments and other resources 
are allocated (input); the way decisions are reached, implemented and 
managed (throughput); the initial results and program interventions and 
projects (outcomes); and their longer-term impact (outcomes). 
Taken together, the cases point to one major conclusion: for foundations, the 
notions of what constitutes and leads to ‘success’ and ‘failure’ are not as 
clear cut as they may seem at first or at face value. One implication for 
foundation representatives and experts is that they should treat any notions 
let alone claims of success and failure with some caution, and that they 
should be equally on guard as to simplifying approaches on how to achieve 
high impact or maximise philanthropy´s contributions. 
However, the case studies do not suggest that planning for success is 
unnecessary or that trying to avoid failures through careful measures would 
be pointless. To the contrary, any plan is better than no plan, as proponents 
of strategic philanthropy remind us and any performance measure better 
than none at all, as venture philanthropists emphasize. Yet the cases in this 
collection shed light on the complex relations between processes and 
outcomes that can be full of uncertainties, even surprises. And while it is 
good for foundations “to keep the eye on the prize” when addressing 
demanding issues and pursuing ambitious goals, the cases presented here 
remind us that a modicum of humble modesty may well be called for. As 
many of the cases in this collection show, in terms of success and failure, the 
actual ability of foundations to manage the often seemingly unmanageable 
relation between processes and outcomes turns out to be more important 
than well thought-out strategic plans and programs. 
In order to understand what this means concretely, a few examples might be 
useful. First, consider a foundation dedicated to feeding the poor. In this 
case, success lies in the maximum number of poor fed, given available 
resources. Note, that success is not about reducing the number of poor 
people seeking help through advocacy aiming at policy changes or 
empowering the poor to fend for themselves. It is charity in the sense of 
 
1 We would like to thank Zora Chan for her support during the editing process. 
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immediate relief, and not philanthropy aiming at underlying causes of 
poverty, to refer to the basic distinction of foundation roles.  
Now, consider a foundation awarding stipends to talented students from 
first generation immigrant families. In this instance, an obvious measure of 
success means maximizing the number of such stipends, again assuming a 
fixed expenditure budget over the lifetime of the awards. Yet unlike the case 
of a foundation feeding the poor, this case invites different measures of 
success: for example, that awardees put the stipend to its best uses by 
graduating on time and with a grade point average that makes for an easy 
transition to the job market; or that they and their families become fully 
integrated upwardly mobile citizens. What is more, the foundation could 
succeed on one measure such as maximising the number of awardees and 
fail on another if graduation rates are low or graduates find it difficult to 
enter the job market. 
Consider yet another case: a foundation decides to address a topic as 
complex as global climate change and sets out to support energy transition 
from carbon-based fuel to renewables. Given the very complexity of issues 
involved, the foundation may be able to set either very general goals (e.g., 
energy transition achieved and negative impact of climate change mitigated) 
or very specific goals (e.g., stipends to young scientists studying global 
climate and energy governance). Note that both are on different timelines, 
and are weakly connected. It is conceivable that the foundation can succeed 
on the specific but fail on the general goal. It is also possible that the impact 
of global climate change will be mitigated, while the stipend program fails or 
remains a moderate success. 
Put differently, the process of goal attainment or more precisely, the 
management of goal-activity alignments, becomes as important as 
obtaining the goal itself, even if the precise connection cannot be shown in 
terms of any stricter notions of causality. Thus, for foundations operating in 
complex environments simple notions of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ may not be 
relevant concepts for assessing performance at all; rather, foundations 
frequently face the challenge of ambiguity of not knowing which is which, or 
where they are in the process towards achieving set goals.  
This ambiguity is born out of the complexity and uncertainly that seems 
inherent in relation to their chosen roles, e.g., working towards set 
outcomes; starting rather than completing activities towards a desired goal; 
building bridges between otherwise unconnected or distrusting 
constituencies, or creating space for diverse parties to convene or discordant 
voices to be heard. The cases included in the collection here speak to what is 
often a situational context full of dilemmas. 
Of course, foundations vary not only in size but also in terms of their 
approaches and activities. In recent years, various typologies have been 
proposed that classify what foundations do, how and for what in terms of 
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different models, styles, roles etc. In this respect, it is useful to separate what 
foundations want to achieve (purpose) from what they do (activities), and 
how (approach). This is shown below as the “Foundation Triangle” (Figure 1). 
The basic idea is that foundations chose, and, consequently, can be 
examined and clustered, in specific combinations of purpose-approach-
activity sets.  
Figure 1: The Foundation Triangle 
Relief 
 
 
Approach 
Operating 
Grant-Making 
 
Activity 
Innovation 
Complementarity 
Substitution 
Build-out 
 
Change       Protection 
 
This triangle classifies the kind of foundations covered by the cases in this 
case collection: with a primary emphasis on change rather than relief and 
protection in terms of purpose, grant-making as the major approach, and 
covering all four activities. Conversely, the cases do not include operating 
foundation such as museums, think tanks, or charities delivering services like 
hospitals and homes for the elderly. 
The cases focus also less on factors such as serendipity (i.e., fortunate but 
ultimately unintended decisions or circumstances leading to good outcomes) 
or purposive malfeasance and wrong doing in foundations (e.g. negligence, 
embezzlement or corruption) contributing to failure. By contrast, we will 
select cases where stakeholders (boards, management, grantees, regulators 
etc.) produced good or bad results that can be judged against some intended 
and agreed-upon, and ultimately identifiable objectives. 
Thus, the cases address issues that go beyond the applicability, usefulness, 
and appropriateness of performance (and output, outcome and impact) 
measures of one kind or another. They examine different aspects of 
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foundations´ operations: the way in which endowments and other resources 
needed are allocated; the way decisions are reached, implemented and 
managed; the initial results and program interventions and projects; and 
outcomes in terms of the longer-term changes.  
The cases offer variations of a basic theme: the ambiguity of what 
constitutes performance in the first place when:  
o Foundation projects operate in highly complex, fast changing and 
often contested fields;  
o They address problems that are ill understood, riddled with 
externalities, and involve implications of many kinds that may not 
be anticipated;  
o What is declared as success or failure depends as much on 
normative preference as on facts, inviting contestations; and  
o Over time, assessments of performance factors and outcomes vary 
ex post as well as ex ante (“moving goal post”).  
Put differently: if exploration towards possible innovations or demonstration 
projects for gauging the applicability of new solutions are the objective of 
foundation activities, then even failure could potentially count as success as 
long as learning from current failure increases the chances of future success. 
Yet how are we to know which is which? What yardsticks or benchmarks 
apply for measuring performance and tracking goal attainment? The 
purpose of this case collection is to sensitize readers to probe deeper into the 
complex set of issues that are behind the performance of foundations and 
wider impact of philanthropy. For unlike in the case of businesses, public 
agencies and NGOs, where case studies and best practice guides are readily 
available, case studies reflecting the specific realities and challenges of 
foundations remain rare. The present collection hopes to help fill this gap. 
In selecting cases, we conducted a broad scan of foundation projects using 
Internet-based searches, and consultations with foundation experts and 
representatives, academics, and policymakers2. We vetted many potential 
cases that came into focus, and selected over thirty for writing up vignettes, 
i.e., concise descriptions of each case using a set protocol, of which twenty 
are included here. 
 
2 Lori Bartczak; Eric Beerbohm; Antje Bischoff; Phil Buchanan; Janet Camarena; 
Nicholas Deakin; Paul Dekker; Meghan Duffy; Alnoor Ebrahim; David Emerson; 
Kathleen Enright; Richard Fries; Marita Haibach; Caroline Hartnell; Rosien Herweijer; 
Roland Kaehlbrandt; Stanley Katz; Katrin Kowark; Mark Kramer; Christine Letts; 
Johanna Mair; Kim Meredith; Gerald Oppenheim; Anne-Claire Pache; Edward Pauly; 
Ryan Pevnick; Catherina Pharoah; Ulrike Posch; Woody Powell; Rob Reich; Kimberly 
Roque; Gerry Salole; Emma Saunders-Hastings; Li Sha; Volker Then; Megan 
Tompkins-Stange; Katherin Watson; Noomi Weinryb; Annette Zimmer 
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Table 1 offers a synopsis of the cases included, summarizing in particular the 
program objective, performance and key issues. 
Table 1: Case Synopsis 
Foundation Programme Programme Objectives Performance Key Issues 
Annenberg 
Foundation, 
USA 
The 
Annenberg 
Challenge 
To combine resources 
and ideas to increase 
effectiveness of public 
schooling 
Made incremental 
changes to public school 
organization but did not 
achieve substantial 
improvements in 
student performance 
Lack of a guiding 
strategy. 
Funding requirements 
diverted funds from 
other non-profits. 
Outdated theory of 
change. 
Barrow 
Cadbury Trust, 
GRB 
The 
Migrants’ 
Rights 
Network 
To give migrants space 
to voice their views and 
experiences and to 
advocate a rights-based 
approach in the field of 
migration policy 
Success of the MRN was 
unclear, evolved from 
small-scale project to 
mid-size organization, 
income base grew more 
than tenfold since 2006 
New focus strengthened 
by experienced 
leadership.  
Long-term involvement 
of key participants. 
Hostile political 
environment restricts 
success. 
Bertelsmann 
Foundation, 
DEU 
Phineo To strengthen civil 
society by serving as 
intermediary between 
potential donors and 
non-profit organizations 
Organizations that were 
analysed a second-time 
since 2012 demonstrated 
significant 
improvements in 
transparency 
Recruitment of external 
partners had costs and 
benefits. 
Growth created trade-
offs between being 
‘established ways’ and 
maintaining the spirit of 
innovation. 
Buttle UK, GRB Buttle UK 
Quality Mark 
for Care 
Leavers 
To improve 
opportunities for and 
experiences of higher 
education for care 
leavers 
Developed ‘quality mark’ 
adopted by 56% of 
universities. Considered 
best practice now by 
govt. But debatable 
effects on care leavers 
choice of university 
Strategic partnerships. 
Strong leadership. 
Favourable policy 
context but allowed 
foundation to capitalise 
on opportunities. 
Calouste 
Gulbenkian 
Foundation, 
PRT 
The 
Immigrant 
Doctors’ 
Recognition 
Project 
To support the 
recognition process of 
immigrant doctors 
First phase 107 of 120 
doctors recognised and 
employed; 
later replicated with less 
success 
CGF in Portugal very 
powerful and well 
networked. Joint project 
with government for 
added leverage 
Compagnia di 
San Paolo, ITA 
Social 
Microcredit 
Programme 
To support the 
entrepreneurial activities 
of clients who were 
incapable of offering 
guarantees and to 
receive conventional 
banking loans 
Economic crisis lead to 
growing need for credit, 
success inconsistent 
across regions, 
project  was forerunner 
of larger micro-credit 
initiative, launched in 
2014 
Network of reliable 
project partners. 
Strong human resource 
strategies. 
Supply of tools instead of 
ready-made solution. 
Eberhard von 
Kuenheim 
Foundation, 
DEU 
A New Start 
for 
Theresientha
l 
To revitalize the 
insolvent manufacturer 
of crystal glass  
Factory is running again 
and over 20 employees 
returned to their 
workplace 
Possible to foster 
entrepreneurship in 
unlikely place under 
difficult circumstances. 
Foundations not self-
interested and therefore 
considered reliable 
partners. 
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Foundation Programme Programme Objectives Performance Key Issues 
Fondazione 
Cariplo, ITA 
Social 
Housing 
To experiment with 
innovative solutions for 
financing, constructing 
and managing 
economically sustainable 
social housing 
Policy influence in 
addition to direct 
benefits in provision of 
housing. Used as model 
for element of National 
Housing Plan 
Illustrates foundation 
role as innovator, 
making links across 
sectors and challenging 
private and public 
institutions. 
Freudenberg 
Foundation, 
DEU 
Service 
Learning 
To promote service 
learning and democratic 
competences / practical 
skills in German schools 
Nation-wide network 
“Lernen durch 
Engagement” was 
developed, did not lead 
to systematic change in 
German education 
system, 
Only 100-200 schools 
implement practice  
New initiative not widely 
implemented due to 
unclear rational. 
Schools and students 
could not be convinced 
of sustainable gain 
through the practice of 
service learning 
 
Fryshuset, 
SWE 
Easy Street 
(“Lugna 
Gatan”) 
Programme 
To reduce violence and 
crime among young 
people in Stockholm’s 
most segregated 
neighbourhoods 
Social impact as labour 
market programme, 
impact on crime rates 
more contested, overall 
considered a successful 
anti-youth-crime project 
Young people not only 
target group but integral 
part of the project. 
Ability of storytelling 
increased success. 
Joseph 
Rowntree 
Charitable 
Trust, GRB 
Campaign 
for Freedom 
of 
Information 
To convince British 
government to introduce 
the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) 
First draft of the FOI Bill 
unsuccessfully 
introduced (1991), 
watered-down FOIA 
gained Royal Assent in 
2000, 
Campaign considered 
important influencer 
Close long-term 
relationships with grant 
recipients. 
Foundation criticised for 
engaging in political 
campaign. 
Testing the limits of 
existing charity laws 
King Baudouin 
Foundation, 
BEL 
The Training 
of Imams 
To enhance 
understanding and 
integration of Muslim 
communities in Belgium 
- specifically via 
understanding of the 
training of imams 
Various positive 
developments in the 
training of imams and 
recognition of Islam. 
Very difficult to attribute 
changes 
Islamophobia increasing 
due to wider factors.  
Example of a foundation 
taking on an issue 
government could 
not/would not touch. 
Körber 
Foundation, 
DEU 
History 
Competition 
of the 
Federal 
President 
To spark interest of 
young people in their 
own history, promote 
independent thinking, 
and strengthen 
students’ sense of 
responsibility 
In 40 years, more than 
136,000 young Germans 
participated, criticism 
due to connection 
between education and 
tobacco industry 
Prizes tend to be low risk 
and high profile. 
In terms of the 
immediate output the 
foundation cannot lose. 
Coopera t ion  with  
political leaders 
heightens visibility. 
Mozaik 
Foundation, 
BIH 
EkoMozaik To create employment 
and integration via an 
economically sustainable 
business in a poor rural 
area 
A very ambitious project 
in a very difficult 
environment - unclear as 
yet if the business can be 
self-sustaining 
It has provided 
employment and it has 
had some integrative 
effects - but economic 
sustainability hampered 
by location and events 
beyond the project’s 
control 
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Foundation Programme Programme Objectives Performance Key Issues 
Open Society 
Foundations, 
USA 
Central 
European 
University 
To create an 
independent and 
academically reputable 
institution to promote 
an open society 
Leading academic 
institution in Central and 
Eastern Europe, 
difficulties in identifying 
its mission/direction, 
accusations of funding 
‘liberal extremism’ 
Philanthropy with 
political agenda runs the 
risk of conflicting with 
domestic government 
policies. 
 
Pew 
Charitable 
Trusts, USA 
Global 
Warming 
and Climate 
Change 
Programme 
& Pew 
Center on 
Global 
Climate 
Change 
Adapted over time, 
basically to change 
policies and practices in 
order to reduce 
greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Various ‘successes’ over 
a 13 year period but 
attribution to 
Foundation not clear 
Complex program which 
adapted as it went along 
- in relation to changing 
policy environment and 
its own perceived 
progress 
Robert Wood 
Johnson 
Foundation, 
USA 
The Tobacco 
Use 
Programmes 
To reduce tobacco use in 
the US, primarily among 
children 
Collaborative and 
changing program.  
Some successes but 
arguably easy wins and 
impossible to attribute 
successes. 
Tobacco companies 
turned attention to 3rd 
world markets I.e. 
arguably problem not so 
much solved as exported 
Adaptive strategy in a 
largely favourable policy 
environment but in face 
of a powerful industry 
lobby. 
Foundation 
anstiftung & 
ertomis, DEU 
Stiftung 
Interkultur: 
Intercultural 
Gardens 
Movement 
To create a platform to 
facilitate intercultural 
community gardening 
Project increased 
political recognition of 
urban gardens, has a 
low-key approach, does 
not aim to force social 
change 
Indirect approach can be 
successful. 
Brings together two 
unrelated issues in 
creative way. 
Role in amplifying what 
might otherwise remain 
isolated experiments. 
Walton Family 
Foundation, 
USA 
Charter 
Schools 
Funding 
To improve K12 
outcomes for all 
students especially those 
of limited means by 
ensuring access to high 
quality educational 
choices (charter schools) 
Increase in charter 
schools in US but debate 
as to whether these 
really improve outcomes 
for all K12 students. 
Poor quality research 
and moving goalposts 
Highlights fact that 
public good is a 
contested concept. 
A foundation may 
achieve objectives but be 
criticised for the nature 
of those objectives. 
William and 
Flora Hewlett 
Foundation, 
USA 
Neighbourho
od 
Improvemen
t Initiative 
To strengthen long-term 
capacity of the 
community foundations 
and neighbourhood 
organizations to sustain 
change 
Project had mixed 
results across 3 
neighbourhoods, some 
positive changes but 
problems due to 
inexperienced partners 
and lacking theory of 
change 
Role in testing and 
pioneering new 
approaches. 
Experiences served as 
lessons learned for other 
foundations. 
Unrealistic expectations 
created tensions with 
partners. 
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The case vignettes included in this collection are meant for use by 
foundation boards, the induction and training of foundation staff, and 
executive education primarily. They are also of use for university teaching in 
master level programs, especially at public policy and business schools. 
Several of the cases will become teaching cases available at Harvard Business 
Publishing3, and a fuller analysis will be forthcoming as a book in 2017 
published by Helmut K. Anheier and Diana Leat (London: Routledge). 
 
Useful references: 
Anheier, H. K. & Hammack D. (eds.) (2010). American Foundations. Roles and 
Contributions. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Anheier, H. K., & Leat, D. (2006). Creative philanthropy: towards a new 
philanthropy for the twenty-first century. London: Routledge.  
Brest, P. (2015). Strategic Philanthropy and Its Discontents. Stanford Social 
Innovation Review, Apr. 27, 2015. 
https://ssir.org/up_for_debate/article/strategic_philanthropy_and_its_disc
ontents  
Frumkin, P. (2006). Strategic giving: the art and science of philanthropy. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
Hammack, D. & Anheier. H. K. (2013). A Versatile American Institution: The 
Changing Ideals and Realities of Philanthropic Foundations. Washington, DC: 
The Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Leat, D. (2016). Philanthropic Foundations, Public Good and Public Policy. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Letts, C. W., Ryan, W., & Grossman, A. (1997). Virtuous capital: what 
foundations can learn from venture capitalists. Harvard Business Review, 
75:2, pp. 36-44. 
Thümler, E., Anheier, H. K., Bögelein, N., & Beller, A. (2014). Philanthropy and 
education: strategies for impact. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
  
 
3 https://cb.hbsp.harvard.edu/cbmp/pages/home 
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Annenberg Foundation, USA 
The Annenberg Challenge 
Description of Specific Programme 
The Annenberg Challenge was the largest single gift made in the 1990s and 
was designed to unite the resources and ideas of those committed to 
increasing the effectiveness of public schooling.4 The three goals the 
foundation had set were to improve education in troubled inner-cities, to 
help isolated and rural schools gain assistance, and to make arts education a 
basic part of every curriculum.5 The programmes operated in 18 target areas, 
included Philadelphia, Chicago and Los Angeles. 
Origins and Rationale 
The Challenge began with Ambassador Annenberg wanting to make the 
“American Dream” a reality for the hundreds of thousands of students 
struggling through K-12 education. To this end, he sought counsel from four 
key advisers: Vartan Gregorian, president of Brown University and currently 
president of the Carnegie Corporation of New York; Theodore Sizer, who led 
the Coalition of Essential Schools based at Brown; and David Kearns, a 
former Xerox Corporation chairman.6 Ambassador Annenberg believed that 
by donating such an unprecedented sum of money to single cause, leaders 
would awaken to the dire need of improving K-12 education, and that other 
philanthropists would be inspired to donate as well. 
Design and Implementation 
Vartan Gregorian was in charge of distributing the funds and also worked as 
Annenberg’s educational advisor. The first grants went to the Annenberg 
Institute for School Reform at Brown University ($50 million), the New 
American Schools Development Corporation ($50 million), and the Education 
Commission of the States ($8.6 million). Beginning in 1995, grants began to 
flow directly to non-profits.7 The foundation had two stipulations: the fund 
could not be given directly to the schools, and they needed to be matched, 
 
4 http://www.annenbergfoundation.org/about/directors-activities/annenberg-
challenge 
5 The Annenberg Foundation (2002). The Annenberg Challenge: Lessons and 
Reflections on Public School Reform. Providence: Annenberg Institute of School 
Reform, p. 6. 
6 Ibid., p. 16. 
7 Wooster, M. (2006). Great Philanthropic Mistakes, Washington D.C.: Hudson 
Institute, p. 137. 
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either 2-1 or 1-1. By funding intermediary organization, the foundation 
believed it would avoid political entanglements and the red tape associated 
with public education.8 Unlike the large sum of grants made by the Walton 
Foundation on behalf of K-12 education, Annenberg focus only on public 
schools for its funding. Just as Walton was criticized for focusing only on 
charter schools, Annenberg was scrutinized for excluding alternatives to 
public schools (see for example Wooster 2006).  
Eighteen challenge projects were implemented in 35 states, which funded a 
total of 2,400 public schools and served more than 1.5 million students.9 The 
grants were supplemented with private matching funds from business and 
other educational stakeholders, which totalled $600 million.10 Of this, $268.8 
came from other foundations, seven of which donated over $10 million. The 
foundation sought to create impact via intermediary organizations, such as 
university presidents, newspaper publishers, and other foundations. 
Moreover, the Challenge took a holistic approach by encouraging the 
involvement of parents and the community.11  
The details of the design depended on feasibility and location. In New York 
City, grants went to four coalitions that were assembled by Deborah Meier, 
who had created the Central Park East system of small school.12 The four 
groups, consisting of The Center for Educational Innovation at the 
Manhattan Institute, New Visions, the NY chapter of the Association of 
Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN), and the Center for 
Collaborative Education, joined to create the New York Networks for Social 
Change in 1995. Under Meier’s leadership, the Networks primarily focused on 
reducing school size. In Chicago, on the other hand, efforts rather focused on 
decentralization and empowering teacher-parent networks.13 
Outcome and Impact 
The Annenberg challenge is often cited as one of the major foundation 
failures of history.14 While it made incremental changes to how public 
 
8 The Annenberg Foundation (2002). The Annenberg Challenge: Lessons and 
Reflections on Public School Reform. Providence: Annenberg Institute of School 
Reform, p. 13. 
9 http://annenberginstitute.org/Challenge/about/about.html 
10 Ibid. 
11 The Annenberg Foundation (2002). The Annenberg Challenge: Lessons and 
Reflections on Public School Reform. Providence: Annenberg Institute of School 
Reform. 
12 Wooster, M. (2006). Great Philanthropic Mistakes. Washington D.C.: Hudson 
Institute, p. 145. 
13 Ibid., p. 147. 
14 Fleishman, J. (2007). The Foundation: A Great American Secret. How Private Wealth 
is Changing the World. New York, NY: PublicAffairs. 
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schools are organized and how students are taught,15 it did not achieve 
substantial improvements in student performance. As with many ambitious 
initiatives, there were several different foundations working on school 
reform simultaneously. In some of the Chicago schools, there were as many 
as 20 different reform efforts, the Annenberg Challenge being only one.16 
This often led to school officials being overwhelmed with the sheer number 
of changes required of them, and feeling powerless to the outside 
impositions. It also made it difficult to attribute failure and/or success to any 
one of the foundation’s efforts. 
When efforts could be attributed, the success of the grants that were 
awarded varied largely. In New York City, the only one out of four 
organizations to achieve continuing success was the Center for Arts 
Education.17 The New York Networks for Social Change helped launch the 
initiative to break up larger schools, but was faced with much resistance 
from Rudy Crew, the school chancellor at the time. Later, the Gates 
Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, and the Open Society Institute 
Programme would also support efforts to create smaller schools, but the 
extent to which school size correlates with achievement is still disputed. 
Although the challenge did not amount to significant quantitative results, 
the foundation cites anecdotal evidence of positive impact. A report claims 
that although the Challenge did not work miracles, it brought hope to 
abandoned schools, helped educators make a ‘new commitment to 
excellence’, and inspired teachers to work more closely with problem 
students. Some of the more specific achievements listed are the expansion 
of arts programmes and professional development opportunities. At the 
same time, it openly admits disappointment, writing that many of the target 
schools are still failing today. 18 
Success or Failure Factors 
As a foundation, Annenberg prides itself in seeking innovative solutions to 
social problems, and accepts failure as part of the process. It writes that it is 
“willing to take measured risks with a tolerance for occasional failure to seek 
out and fund outstanding people and organizations.”19 The Annenberg 
 
15 Wooster, M. (2006). Great Philanthropic Mistakes. Washington D.C.: Hudson 
Institute. 
16 Russo, A. (2000). From Frontline Leader to Rearguard Actions: The Chicago 
Annenberg Challenge. In R. Domanico, C. Innerst & A. Russo (Eds.), Can Philanthropy 
Fix Our Schools? Appraising Walter Annenberg’s $500 Million Gift to Public Education 
(pp. 33-50), Washington D.C.: Thomas B. Fordham Foundation. 
17 Fleishman, J. (2007). The Foundation: A Great American Secret. How Private Wealth 
is Changing the World. New York, NY: PublicAffairs, p. 267. 
18 The Annenberg Foundation (2002). The Annenberg Challenge: Lessons and 
Reflections on Public School Reform. Providence: Annenberg Institute of School 
Reform. 
19 http://www.annenbergfoundation.org/grantmaking 
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Challenge, however, appears to go well beyond the acceptable range of 
failures. Some of the factors that contributed to this failure are: 
o The lack of a guiding strategy. Rather than having a clear theory of 
change, the challenge relied on districts to test approaches, claiming 
non-partisanship as its only ideology.20 
o All funds needed to be matched, meaning that only schools which 
had already set aside funds for reform could participate in the 
Challenge. Moreover, this requirement had the unintended 
consequence of diverting funds away from other non-profits, which 
were forced scale back or close down. This was particularly 
noticeable in Philadelphia, where local cultural institutions and 
NGOs suffered from the significant drop in funding from local 
foundations, who chose to invest more in education instead.21  
o In his case study on the programme, Wooster criticized Annenberg 
for using an archaic theory of change that had already been 
employed by other foundations and proven to be ineffective.22 
Many of the Annenberg programmes were eliminated by structural changes 
in public education systems due to continuously low performing schools. For 
instance, Philadelphia schools were taken over by the state of Pennsylvania 
in 2002, which subsequently eliminated the Annenberg inspired school 
clusters and teacher training programmes. 
Lessons Learned 
 Level of spending does not necessarily correlate with impact. The 
Annenberg challenge received widespread attention for the sheer 
amount of money it committed rather than having a promising 
strategy for change. 
 A theory of change should consider the strategies and failures of 
other foundations to avoid repeating mistakes and setting yourself 
up for failure. 
 Even a good theory of change can fail in light of on the ground 
opposition and contextual changes. This can be mitigated by 
building a strong consensus prior to implementing the project.  
 
20 The Annenberg Foundation (2002). The Annenberg Challenge: Lessons and 
Reflections on Public School Reform. Providence: Annenberg Institute of School 
Reform, p. 13. 
21 Innerst, C. (2000). Grant Brings High Hopes, Modest Gains to Philadelphia School 
Reform Effort. In Domanico, C. Innerst & A. Russo (Eds.), Can Philanthropy Fix Our 
Schools? Appraising Walter Annenberg’s $500 Million Gift to Public Education (pp. 19-
32). Washington D.C.: Thomas B. Fordham Foundation. 
22 Wooster, M. (2006). Great Philanthropic Mistakes. Washington D.C.: Hudson 
Institute, p. 144. 
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Barrow Cadbury Trust, GRB 
The Migrants’ Rights Network 
Description of Specific Programme 
The Migrants’ Rights Network (MRN) is a British non-profit organization that 
supports the rights of migrants through their work and campaigns. Its 
overarching goal is to give migrants space “to voice their views and 
experiences” and to advocate a “rights-based approach” in the field of 
migration policy.23 To this end, the organization serves as a platform and 
meeting space for migrant activists, academics, and representatives of 
support organizations, faith groups and the public sector. Besides being the 
heart of this dynamic network, the organization's main activities include: 
supporting migrant activism on a local and national level, generating and 
sharing information on migration issues, and raising awareness through 
media work, public events and lobbying campaigns.24 Additionally, the MRN 
also serves as the secretariat for the All-Party Parliamentary Group on 
Migration.25 The network is known for an innovative approach, combining 
grassroots mobilization, parliamentary work and in-depth analyses of 
current policies and practices.26 
Origins and Rationale 
The Barrow Cadbury Trust has a long history of financially supporting local 
migrants’ organizations and advocacy groups focusing on migrants’ rights, 
especially in the West Midlands where the Trust and the Cadbury business 
were originally based.27 In the 1990s, migration patterns changed rapidly in 
Great Britain: the number of migrants increased substantially - in particular 
economic migrants - and their countries of origin became more and more 
diverse. National policy and public discourse reflected these changes; 
migration became a high-profile issue. Some tabloid newspapers 
encouraged voters to believe that mass migration could have negative 
consequences for the British society. National migration policy took these 
fears into account by developing a more coercive migration regime. A 
 
23 http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/about 
24 Ibid.  
25 All-Party Parliamentary Groups are informal groups of Members of both Houses 
with a common interest in particular issues, http://www.appgmigration.org.uk/ 
26 http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/files/publications/Annual_report_2014.pdf  
27 Thümler, E. (2011). The Migrants’ Rights Network of Barrow Cadbury Trust: What 
impact can we hope to have? CSI research project Strategies for Impact in 
Philanthropy, Case Study CSI TC 017. Heidelberg: Centre for Social Investment of 
Heidelberg University, p. 2. 
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number of new migrant organizations were established, which the Barrow 
Cadbury Trust had not worked with before.28 
If the Barrow Cadbury Trust wanted to continue being an active player in the 
changing migration landscape, it had to become familiar with new 
organizations, find innovative ways to address policy issues, and focus on 
influencing public opinion.29 Consequently, the Trust invested in a large 
research project to find “gaps in the civil society landscape”.30 What was the 
state of the UK’s migrant and refugee sector? What were possible fields of 
actions? How did other organization approach new challenges? In 2006, the 
Barrow Cadbury Trust launched the report “Migrant Voices, Migrant Rights” 
by Don Flynn, an employee of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants 
(JCWI).31 In his report, Flynn concluded that the migrant sector was highly 
fragmented and chronically underfunded. Migrants’ rights groups were 
facing hostile reactions from the public and lacked access to national policy 
influence. Their voices were not heard and long-term solutions to their 
problems almost impossible to achieve.32 
Flynn proposed an umbrella organization as a possible solution to these 
issues, which could develop a strong network and common platform to 
connect diverse migration activists with each other (vertically) and the 
government (horizontally). The organization could also serve as a 
campaigning base to make the voices of migrants heard on a local and 
national level.33 
Design and Implementation 
In December 2006, the MRN was launched. It was designed to serve as a 
forceful campaigning tool to address policy issues, support informed 
legislation and enable migrants to have a leadership role in this process. It 
also aimed to influence public opinion by creating a more informed and 
positive narrative.34 Its work can be categorized into three main themes: 
“grassroots advocacy, communications work, and parliamentary work.” 35 
 
 
 
28 Ibid., p. 3. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p. 4. 
31 http://www.geog.qmul.ac.uk/docs/research/5333.pdf 
32 Thümler, E. (2011). The Migrants’ Rights Network of Barrow Cadbury Trust: What 
impact can we hope to have? CSI research project Strategies for Impact in 
Philanthropy, Case Study CSI TC 017. Heidelberg: Centre for Social Investment of 
Heidelberg University, p. 4. 
33 Ibid., p. 5. 
34 Ibid., p. 6. 
35 
http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/files/publications/MRN_Annual_Report_2011.pdf 
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Examples of the MRN’s main projects include the following:  
o MRN Policy and Communications work: From the start, the MRN was 
heavily involved in research and policy analysis. Their experts write 
briefing papers for government representatives and provide easy 
access to information for the general public. Due to their insight and 
knowledge, MRN employees are regularly featured in the media. 
Additionally, the organization runs heavily used social media 
accounts and websites.36 
o MRN London Work: In 2009 the MRN intensified its focus on London 
based community groups. It joined forces with the London Strategic 
Migration Partnership and influential London migrant organizations 
to strengthen migrant’s rights including access to health care.37 
o All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration: Since 2011, the MRN 
serves as the secretariat of the APPG on Migration, bringing together 
MPs and Peers of all parties to discuss migration issues in an open 
and well-informed way.38 
o Women on the Move Awards: Since 2012, the MRN organizes this 
award, which celebrates successful migrant and refugee women.39 
o “We are Family” Campaign: The campaign was set up in 2012 to 
highlight the new changes to the family migration rules, which 
make it more difficult for British citizens to bring their foreign 
partners to Great Britain. As a consequence, many affected families 
struggle with long-term separation.40 
Outcome and Impact 
At the beginning of the project, the success of the MRN was very unclear. 
Some experts feared the risk of “complete and utter failure” and predicted 
that the Barrow Cadbury Trust would not only lose money but also its 
credibility in the field.41 Yet, despite these concerns, the MRN evolved from an 
initially small-scale project to an organization with seven members of staff 
and a wide range of activities.42 Since 2006, the MRN has grown its income 
base more than tenfold (2006/2007: £29,921 to 2013/2014: £330,128).43 
 
36 http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/files/publications/Annual_report_2014.pdf 
37 Ibid. 
38 http://www.appgmigration.org.uk/about 
39 http://womenonthemoveawards.org.uk/ 
40 http://family.migrantsrights.org.uk/ 
41 Thümler, E. (2011). The Migrants’ Rights Network of Barrow Cadbury Trust: What 
impact can we hope to have? CSI research project Strategies for Impact in 
Philanthropy, Case Study CSI TC 017. Heidelberg: Centre for Social Investment of 
Heidelberg University, p. 2. 
42 
http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/files/publications/MRN_Annual_Report_2011.pdf 
43 http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/files/publications/Annual_report_2014.pdf 
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MRN continues to expand the available resources on migration issues and 
provides background information for political decision makers. MRN 
strengthens the leadership capacities and management capabilities of 
community groups by offering professional training.44 In addition, MRN’s has 
been influential on occasions in raising the policy profile of issues and 
stimulating debate. For example, in 2013, the APPG on Migration initiated a 
parliamentary inquiry into the changes of the family migration rules. The 
Chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee called the resulting report “a 
stunning report, which everyone needs to read with great care.”45 The 
national media covered the inquiry in great detail and the issue was 
discussed during multiple debates in Parliament. The MRN continues to 
persistently campaign for changing this policy.46 Another project, which has 
arguably received widespread public attention, is the “Women on the Move 
Award”. Prize-winning women raise awareness for their work and gain 
extensive recognition for their efforts. A fellowship for the winners includes 
leadership development training, financial support, and networking 
opportunities.47 
Success or Failure Factors 
The new focus on migration issues was introduced by Sukhvinder Kaur-
Stubbs, the then CEO of the Barrow Cadbury Trust. Her experience with a 
similar project on the EU level (Network Against Racism) served as a model 
for the MRN. Furthermore, she was able to draw on her expertise in the area 
of public policy and campaigning as well as her own migration background.48 
In addition to having an experienced leadership, the project benefited from 
the long-term involvement of key participants in the field of migration 
policy. Although much work remains to be done, most partner organizations 
were considered credible and legitimate by members of the political 
establishment as well as the general public. Diverse partners like Asylum Aid, 
the Institute for Public Policy Research, multiple trade unions, the 
Confederation of British Industry, the Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants, and Oxfam broadened MRN’s reach on a national level.49 
When Don Flynn introduced his initial idea of an umbrella organization, he 
hoped to “start a social movement” that could change public opinion and 
 
44 Thümler, E. (2011). The Migrants’ Rights Network of Barrow Cadbury Trust: What 
impact can we hope to have? CSI research project Strategies for Impact in 
Philanthropy, Case Study CSI TC 017. Heidelberg: Centre for Social Investment of 
Heidelberg University, p. 6. 
45 http://www.migrantsrights.org.uk/files/publications/Annual_report_2014.pdf 
46 Ibid.  
47 http://womenonthemoveawards.org.uk/impact/ 
48 Thümler, E. (2011). The Migrants’ Rights Network of Barrow Cadbury Trust: What 
impact can we hope to have? CSI research project Strategies for Impact in 
Philanthropy, Case Study CSI TC 017. Heidelberg: Centre for Social Investment of 
Heidelberg University, pp. 3-4. 
49 Ibid., p. 5. 
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solve migration issues.50 However, opinions against migration in the UK are 
hardening: poll ratings suggest that 76% of British people want immigration 
reduced,51 50% chose immigration as the most important issue facing them 
and their family,52 and 67% thought that employers should give priority to 
British people when recruiting.53 The public narrative focuses on “what 
migrants are taking away from us”. 54 This hostile environment caused policy 
makers in many cases to restrict the rights of immigrants instead of moving 
towards a more “humanitarian migration regime”.55 
Lessons Learned 
 Foundations have to continuously re-evaluate their areas of 
expertise and adjust to political and social changes. 
 Foundations may be in a good position to bring together experts in 
specific policy fields. 
 Even well-considered projects struggle in a hostile political 
environment. 
 
50 Ibid., p. 6. 
51https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/r4762fpv66/Y
G-Archive-Pol-Sunday-Times-results-060315.pdf 
52https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/na190nomoq
/YG-Archives-Pol-Trackers-Issues%282%29-Most-important-issues-030315.pdf 
53http://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/88q0g7tq8f/Y
G-Archive-140211-Channel5-Immigration.pdf 
54 Thümler, E. (2011). The Migrants’ Rights Network of Barrow Cadbury Trust: What 
impact can we hope to have? CSI research project Strategies for Impact in 
Philanthropy, Case Study CSI TC 017. Heidelberg: Centre for Social Investment of 
Heidelberg University, p. 5. 
55 Ibid. 
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Bertelsmann Foundation, DEU 
Phineo 
Description of Specific Programme 
Phineo is an independent, non-profit, joint-stock company that was founded 
by the Bertelsmann Foundation (BF) in 2009 and has been operational since 
2010. The name of the company is a portmanteau of “philanthropy” and 
“neo,” which highlight its innovative approach to supporting philanthropy. 
With clients ranging from individual donors and consultants to companies 
and foundations, its goal is to strengthen civil society by serving as in 
intermediary between potential donors and charities.  
Social investors are often unsure about which charities and projects to 
support, which is where Phineo comes in. By providing impact analyses, 
workshops, and quality assurances on charities, Phineo provides guidance in 
philanthropic decisions.56 Both sides mutually benefit from this; investors are 
guided to think more strategically about their contributions, and charities 
are provided with expertise on their impact and effectiveness along with the 
opportunity to showcase their work, which in turn spurs social investment 
and volunteerism. The ultimate winners are the people that the social 
investors and non-profits serve.  
Phineo is primarily financed by its shareholders, the biggest of which are the 
Bertelsmann Foundation and Deutsche Börse AG, in addition to topic-specific 
funding partners. Partners include KPMG, PWC, Stiftung Mercator, 
Stifterverband and NPC. Financial support from shareholders varies. BF 
makes one of the largest contributions but only has 15% of the votes. By 2014 
BF had invested around 7 million Euros in Phineo. It anticipates continuing to 
contribute to the funding of Phineo for several years to come. 
Origins and Rationale 
Beginning in the 1990s, Bertelsmann began thinking about ways to 
encourage charitable giving. There seemed to be a fertile ground for 
philanthropy; not only were the people who had profited from the post-
WWII economic boom beginning to retire, but Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) had also started gaining popularity in the for-profit 
 
56 https://www.phineo.org/english 
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world.57 Although people and organizations were willing to give, there was 
still room for growth. Bertelsmann believed that one of the obstacles to 
greater giving was the frequent lack of transparency among non-profits. 
Donors had no easy way of knowing which organizations they could trust, 
and charities were missing opportunities to showcase their value and work.  
 
Bertelsmann was not the first to identify this need. In 2002, New 
Philanthropy Capital (NPC) was founded in London to connect donors and 
charities. When BF became aware of NPC’s work, it decided to explore this 
model for its own work. It took several years for BF to develop this idea, but 
Phineo managed to become an independent company three years after the 
plan was hatched.  
Design and Implementation 
BF explored several options for implementing its plan. One idea was that the 
new organization should be a project within BF, but it was felt that this 
might only lead to a 5 or 10 year commitment rather than a more permanent 
organization.58 Furthermore, staff wanted a wider range of people and 
organizations involved in Phineo. It was finally agreed that Phineo would be 
incubated within BF but separated from the Foundation and made fully 
independent as soon as possible.59 
BF decided to structure Phineo based on the NPC model, which needed to be 
adapted to the German context. The success of this model in Britain is 
exemplified by its adoption in other countries, namely Sweden, Israel and 
Brazil.60 However, the concept of measuring impact was quite new in 
Germany, and many stakeholders felt this topic was a major taboo.61 
Nevertheless, BF managed to get people on board. The need for such work 
was emphasized by a Bertelsmann survey of some 500 foundations 
(conducted in 2005), which found that every tenth founder would expand 
his/her charitable work if that had more information about the impact of 
their funded activities.62  
The Bertelsmann Foundation received mixed reviews from the non-profit 
sector, which was acutely conscious of the fact that this endeavour would 
result in winners and losers, meaning funds risked being diverted from one 
organization to another. This process took several years, as BF was testing 
 
57 Leat, D. (2014). The Inventive Foundation: creating new ventures in Europe, p. 26. 
http://www.gulbenkian.org.uk/files/15-05-14-The%20Inventive%20Foundation.pdf 
58 Ibid. p. 27. 
59 Ibid. 
60 http://www.thinknpc.org/about-npc/our-history/  
61 Leat, D. (2014). The Inventive Foundation: creating new ventures in Europe, p. 28. 
http://www.gulbenkian.org.uk/files/15-05-14-The%20Inventive%20Foundation.pdf 
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the German market and working to recruit a diverse group of partners to 
build a strong consensus. The partners/shareholders were carefully targeted 
to include both for-profit and non-profit organizations. 
Outcome and Impact 
Phineo is essentially working towards creating a more transparent 
philanthropic sector in Germany, where foundations have relatively low 
reporting requirements. While foundations frequently report on what they 
are doing, they are less likely to say in how far they have reached specific 
goals or contributed to a cause. Phineo uses several strategies to encourage 
greater transparency for greater impact.  
A large component of its work is to carry out analyses on non-profits. A 
“Phineo-Analysis” is rooted in scientific methods and takes into account the 
knowledge of theory and practice.63 It conducts these in several different 
stages, beginning with an online questionnaire, followed by informational 
material, on-site visits, and an assessment of its findings. The final summary 
addresses the strengths, weaknesses and funding needs of an organization. 
As a part of its quality assessment process, it awards exemplary 
organizations with a “Phineo impact label.” Based on this work, from 2011-
2014 Phineo expanded its activities to include formats for capacity building 
for non-profit organizations and a strategic consultancy service.64 
In addition to analyses, Phineo hosts workshop series on topics such as 
venture philanthropy and impact-oriented investment.65 These are open to 
charitable organization and business, drawing social investors and 
consultants alike. The presentations are based on Phineo’s publications on 
the practical implementation of impact-oriented work. Moreover, it provides 
potential donors with sector reports that describe the structures of non-
profit engagement, highlight outstanding examples, and provide tips on 
effective giving. In order to connect donors with charities, it has also used an 
innovate approach – social speed-dating—during which donors and 
recipients had the opportunity to sit together for several rounds and learn 
about mutual interests and challenges.66 
These initiatives have already demonstrated a positive impact. In their study, 
Wirkungstransparenz bei Spendenorganizationen (2014) (Impact-
transparency of Charitable Organizations), Phineo found that the 
organizations that were analysed a second-time since 2012 demonstrated 
 
63 Phineo (2014). Engagement mit Wirkung: Die Phineo-Analysenmethode im Detail. 
Berlin: Phineo gAG. 
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http://www.gulbenkian.org.uk/files/15-05-14-The%20Inventive%20Foundation.pdf 
65 https://www.phineo.org/english  
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significant improvements in transparency.67 Thus it appears that charitable 
organizations are increasingly learning that the more transparent they are, 
the more trust they can build with donors, and the more people are willing to 
invest. 
Success or Failure Factors 
Recruiting a wide group of external partners depended on internal support 
and resources: ’It’s such a big investment, it takes so long and there are so 
many risks so you must have Board and staff champions - and a team to 
make it happen and who are knowledgeable enough to be convincing to 
other partners’. Some potential partners questioned why BF did not want to 
fully fund Phineo and run it alone.  
Getting partners involved took time. Phineo was a new concept and partners 
needed persuading. Having the model incubated at BF was seen as one of 
the factors in successfully recruiting other partners. Another factor in success 
was said to be the Bertelsmann Foundation name and networks. But finding 
the right balance in the relationship between Phineo and Bertelsmann was 
seen as a tricky issue. The BF name was useful but the danger was that 
Phineo would be seen as ‘belonging’ to the Foundation. 
A diverse group of partners was seen as crucial not only for legitimacy but 
also because it signalled cooperation between unlikely players and 
emphasized that Phineo is about building bridges between sectors.  
Intellectual property is an enduring issue for Phineo and one that has direct 
implications for funding. In 2013-14 BF gave around 1 million euros to Phineo 
per annum. It has no set date when it will cease to fund Phineo - this is partly 
because ‘achievement of the mission will take a generation’ and partly 
because Phineo will always be dependent on donors because it is supplying 
public knowledge’. 
Phineo has grown since 2011. This growth has created some tensions in 
managing the trade-off between being ‘established’ and maintaining the 
spirit of innovation. 
Lessons Learned 
 Having an existing model on which to build a new idea can provide 
additional credibility and inspire other partners to get on board.  
 Foundations are powerful tools to promote independent 
organizations and involving the necessary stakeholders. 
 It is important to be aware of the dangers of being seen as a 
foundation’s baby.  
 
67 http://www.phineo.org/presse/pressemitteilungen/pressemitteilungen/studie-50-
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Buttle UK, GRB 
BQM for Care Leavers 
Description of Specific Programme 
The Buttle UK Quality Mark (BQM) provides a framework for higher 
education institutions (HEI) to improve their support to young adults coming 
from public care. A care leaver is defined as “a person aged 25 or under, who 
has been looked after by a local authority for at least 13 weeks since the age 
of 14; and who was looked after by the local authority at the school-leaving 
age or after that date.”68  
It is an initiative that was created in 2006 in response to an extensive 5- year 
research project on the experience of care leavers in higher education. The 
research, which was commissioned by Buttle UK and carried out by the 
University of London, demonstrated the lack of support for care leavers in 
HEIs. In response to these findings, Buttle UK developed the BQM to 
encourage HEIs to make a stronger commitment to support. The mark is 
linked to a Commitment charter, which recommends a minimal level of 
criteria but also allows for flexibility with the implementation and degree of 
support. This gives HEI’s a sense of ownership and also takes into account 
the variability of their capacities. 
Gerri McAndrew, the Chief Executive of Buttle UK, had ambitions to use this 
research to influence policy. But first, she needed to convince the trustees of 
her plan. The role of the trust was foremost to relieve children from small 
financial hardships, and the trustees were initially hesitant to go beyond 
their traditional role, not least because of the additional resources this would 
demand. Advocacy was new territory for the trust, which did not yet have an 
established network of partners in higher education. However, McAndrew 
was able to frame the idea as part of a partnership-building exercise that 
could potentially reduce calls on the trust’s resources.69 Thanks to existing 
momentum in government on issues related to child poverty, the trust found 
key partners throughout the UK and could move ahead with its plans.  
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The general goals of the programme were: 
o To increase the number of foster children in universities, but also to 
improve their overall experience; 
o Help local authorities better fulfill their obligations as “corporate 
parents.” 
o Raise awareness about the specific challenges for social workers, 
teachers, foster parents and residential workers.70 
Origins and Rationale 
Buttle UK had received a high number of applications from cared for minors 
through one if its grant programmes for students and trainees. Based on 
this, the trust realized that care leavers faced many unacknowledged 
challenges.71 The parliament had already passed several acts to aid children 
in poverty, including the Children (Leaving Care) Act 2000, which put 
stronger duties on local authorities to care for foster children, and increased 
the care age from 16 to 21.72 Although the Children Act 2000 required local 
authorities to provide financial and personal support to foster children up to 
the age of 24, it did not specifically address the difficulties many foster 
children faced once they entered into higher education.73 No part of society 
was more excluded from higher education than care leavers, which only 
made up 1% of students in HE.74 Of the nearly 11,000 young people that were 
leaving care in 2004, only 60 were going to university.75 At the same time, 
the “Aim higher” initiatives of government designed to widen the 
participation in education did not appear to raise awareness of the specific 
needs of care leavers. 
The issue of care leavers in higher education had received little attention, 
mostly due to lack of knowledge and awareness. While the government had 
programmes that focused on reducing child poverty, there was no particular 
focus on foster care children. The assumption seemed to be that once young 
adults entered into higher education, the university would take over as 
“proxy parent.” In order to challenge this assumption, Buttle UK wanted 
empirical data. The trust launched a five-year research study that involved 
129 care-leavers, made possible by the support of its partners.76 The research 
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provided important information on a group that had previously never been 
studied. This led to Buttle UK developing the idea of a BQM for care leavers. 
Design and Implementation 
Once the trust became aware of the problem, it developed a systematic 
strategy to tackle this issue. First, it gathered information to provide 
evidence about the unique challenges care leavers face; next, it devised and 
implemented a dissemination strategy to raise awareness about the need for 
more support from higher education institutions and public authorities; 
finally, the trust cooperated with the universities to promote change via the 
BQM. These three phases are described in more detail below. 
The foundation launched a 5-year research project in 2001 to assess the 
challenges of Care Leavers in higher education. Under its previous director, 
the trust commissioned a report from Professor Sonia Jackson from the 
Thomas Coram Research Unit of the Institute of Higher Education, University 
of London. The project was funded with external funds so that the trust 
could continue its regular programming. The project funders were the 
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, Esmée Fairbairn Foundation, Garfield 
Weston Foundation, The Grand Charity, KPMG Foundation, The Pilgrim Trust 
and the Department for Education and Skills.77 
The trust launched the report at a major conference in May 2005. 
Coincidentally, the government at that time had been working on a more 
participatory and cross-ministerial approach. Just a year prior, it had passed 
The Children Act 2004 that sought to consolidate government functions of 
children's welfare and education in a more concerted effort. This allowed the 
trust to network. The Conference was instrumental in getting the right 
people on board and establishing cooperation across government. In 
addition to launching the report, the trust embarked on a dissemination 
programme with the help of KPMG. The aim was to further raise awareness 
of the issue and ultimately to encourage stakeholders to invest more 
resources into care leavers.  
Buttle UK received an immense amount of support for this endeavour from 
all four governments across the UK, in addition to a professional umbrella 
organization that helped facilitate the growth of the BQM. In this regard, 
Buttle UK played the role of a catalytic leader. Thanks to a consensus on the 
pertinence of this issue, it was pushed up the policy agenda relatively 
quickly.78 McAndrew found a particularly important ally in Geoff Layer, who 
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was the vice-chancellor of Bradford University. He had spoken at the launch 
event and was very enthusiastic about the endeavour. Together they 
developed the idea of a BQM for higher education.  
Outcome and Impact 
The Buttle UK Quality Mark is one of the key success stories for children 
leaving care.79 Six years after the research project was commissioned, the 
trust had not only managed to recruit a wide base of support for care leavers 
in higher education, but also successfully launched the BQM, which had 
catalysed changes in 199 institutions, 114 universities and 85 colleges.80  
In addition, the programme helped impact government policy. The BQM was 
mentioned in the Green Paper, “Care Matters: Transforming the Lives of 
Children and Young People in Care,” which was presented to Parliament in 
2006. It was further cited in the white paper “Care Matters: Time for 
Change.” In the end, a number of the trust’s recommendation were 
implemented, including a national bursary for Care Leavers going off to 
study and training for key university staff.81 
Since the Mark was implemented, the educational attainment of care leavers 
had also improved. In 2006, only 1% of care leavers went to university. By 
2011, the number had risen to 6%. Thanks to these achievements, the BQM 
won a charity award for Education and Training in June 2011.82 Furthermore, 
most universities in the UK now provide accommodation for care leavers all 
year round.83 It should be noted, however, that the overall number of people 
pursuing a higher education had also increased (See figure A1).  
In order to assess the impact of this initiative more precisely, Buttle UK 
commissioned York Consulting to evaluate the BQM’s impact. The 
conclusions were published in 2013 with several key findings that spoke to 
the positive impact of the initiative. 
Success or Failure Factors 
Overall, the trust succeeded in raising awareness about the needs of care 
leavers, making connections with a range of bodies and leveraging the 
momentum within the government’s policy agenda to promote positive 
changes in HEIs. It introduced the award-winning BQM, which was 
considered to be a best practice by Her Majesty’s Government in the report 
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Care Matters: Transforming the Lives of Children and Young People in Care 
and by the Scottish executive in the report Looked After Children and Young 
People: We can and must do better.84 In making an assessment, the 
following factors should be considered.  
While the trust takes pride in these accomplishments, it acknowledges the 
importance of having had a favourable political climate and bipartisan 
consensus.85 Child poverty was a major component of the Labour party’s 
platform in the early 2000s. In 2003, a coalition of non-governmental bodies 
known as the End Child Poverty (ECP) had committed to eliminating child 
poverty by 2020. To this end, civil society throughout the country was 
mobilizing to reach and influence decision-makers.86 In 2007, David 
Cameron’s government continued this agenda, which was a matter of cross-
party consensus. This led to the passing of the Child Poverty Act in 2010, 
which essentially committed all future governments of the UK to take action 
against child poverty until it is eradicated. 87 The momentum around this 
topic, of which care leavers are a subset, provided a window for adding care 
leavers in higher education to the political agenda.  
Gerri McAndrew played a crucial role in spearheading the programme for 
care leavers. She was appointed Chief Executive of the trust in 2003 and was 
well connected in the fields of social services and the voluntary child sector.88 
This bode well for the trust’s partnership building efforts, but the newly 
appointed CEO did much more than strengthen Buttle UK’s external ties. She 
also took an inward look at the trust to see what areas could be improved.  
Part of the trust’s success in advocating for care leavers can be attributed to 
the operational improvements spearheaded by McAndrew. In 2004, she 
launched a review process that resulted in a complete overhaul of the trust’s 
grant-making system. At the time, the grant-making process was still 
entirely paper based. With the help of an external IT consultant, the trust 
moved to an electronic grant management system that significantly cut 
overall administrative costs. Thanks to these changes, the turnaround time 
for its child support grants went from six weeks to one, and the number of 
grants awarded increased by 81% within the period from 2004 to 2009.89  
While these improvements freed up valuable time for the staff, they also led 
to a doubling of child support applications. The large traffic of requests 
helped Buttle UK realize that care leavers were a neglected policy area. In 
 
84 Mallon, J. (2007). Returning to education after care: protective factors in the 
development of resilience, Adoption & Fostering, 31:1, pp. 106–117. 
85http://www.powershow.com/view/13b959-
MDM3O/The_Frank_Buttle_Trust_Quality_Mark_powerpoint_ppt_presentation  
86 http://www.cpag.org.uk/ending-child-poverty-by-2020 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
89 
http://www.civilsociety.co.uk/charityawards/content/8964/the_frank_buttle_trust 
32 
order to continue meeting the needs of its grantees, Buttle UK forged new 
strategic partnerships. This contributed to the trust’s long-term 
sustainability and also improved its lobbying capacity. By working in 
collaboration with other social welfare organizations on the national and 
local level, the trust could pursue more ambitious changes.90  
As an additional measure in meeting its needs, the trust requested a “total 
return order” from the Charity Commission. This allowed Buttle UK to use 
additional funds from its endowment.91 The charity could increase its small 
grant giving by 67% within 5 years (an increase of about £500,000 per year).92 
Permission for this was granted in 2006, the same year that the BQM was 
launched.  
By 2014, the trust felt that it had reached its goal of raising awareness among 
universities and colleges in the UK. It had established the necessary 
structures to allow other actors and institutions to step in and take its place. 
Feeling confident that the needs of care leavers in HE had finally become 
recognized, the trust opted to discontinue the BQM in 2015, when it made its 
last awards.93 The BQM thus came to an end after a nearly decade-long run. 
Instead, the trust has diverted its attention to a new initiative: the study on 
the benefits of boarding schools for vulnerable children. 94  
In terms of monitoring and support, McAndrew writes: "As the commitment 
becomes increasingly embedded within the further and higher education 
sector, we will be looking to the UK governments and umbrella organizations 
to take over the monitoring of support for this specific cohort through their 
funding conditionality arrangements." In hindsight, it was felt that more 
resources could have been invested in cultivating lasting partnerships.95 
Lessons Learned 
 Framing matters: by reframing the issue of care leavers, McAndrew 
was able to win the support of the Trust. 
 Strategic partnerships and support helped the trust make an impact 
on public policy that it otherwise would not have been able to 
achieve. 
 
90 Ibid. 
91 As of January 2014 
92 
http://www.civilsociety.co.uk/charityawards/content/8964/the_frank_buttle_trust  
93 http://www.buttleuk.org/areas-of-focus/quality-mark-for-care-leavers  
94 Buttle UK (2015). Annual Review 2014-15: Launching Children & Young People into 
Life. London: Buttle UK. 
95 Leat, D. (2007). Just Change. Strategies for Increasing Philanthropic Impact, p. 35. 
http://www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk/carnegieuktrust/wp-
content/uploads/sites/64/2016/02/pub14550117101.pdf 
33 
 Success has a life of its own: some of the attention the ‘campaign’ 
for care leavers was luck, but McAndrew also capitalized on the 
opportunities in her surroundings. 
 When programmatic success hinges overwhelmingly on the 
leadership of an individual, it is important to ensure that 
institutional knowledge is adequately dispersed and passed on 
within the organization; partnerships need long-term and persistent 
care. 
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Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, PRT 
The Immigrant Doctors’ Recognition Project 
Description of Specific Programme 
The Immigrant Doctors’ Recognition Project was a joint venture between the 
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, the Portuguese Ministry of Health and the 
Jesuit Refugee Service. From 2003 to 2005, the programme offered support 
to 120 trained foreign doctors, legally living Portugal during their 
qualification recognition processes. With the financial backing of the 
Foundation, the Jesuit Refugee Service offered grants for language courses, 
internships and professional literature, and also supported the doctors 
through various bureaucratic processes and enrolment in the Portuguese 
Medical Association. The project succeeded in integrating 106 immigrant 
doctors into the Portuguese National Health System. This was a life-
changing opportunity for these professionals, who previously had to make 
their living as cab drivers, on construction sites or in restaurants.96 
Origins and Rationale 
Through the Immigrant Doctors Recognition Project the Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation addressed a combination of pressing social and economic issues. 
On the one hand, there was a severe shortage of qualified doctors in Portugal 
due to rigorous admission restrictions at the country’s medical schools 15 
years prior.97 On the other hand, more and more people were migrating to 
Portugal. In 1981 54,424 foreigners were living in Portugal (0,6% of total 
population). These were mostly Portuguese speaking immigrants from the 
former colonies (Brazil, Cape Verde, Angola, Guinea-Bissau), who moved to 
Portugal in the 1970s due to decolonization.98 In the 1990s, the second wave 
of immigration was triggered by the end of the Soviet Union. This new wave 
was predominantly Eastern European, moving to Portugal to work in the 
booming construction and tourism industries.99 But there were significant 
numbers of highly educated and professionally qualified people among this 
new wave of immigrants. Among them were many doctors, who were 
 
96http://www.gulbenkian.pt/inst/en/TheFoundation/GulbenkianProgrammes/Hum
anDevelopmentProgramme?a=1853  
97 Campos Franco, R. (2011). Exercising political leadership: The Immigrant Doctors’ 
Recognition Project and the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, CSI research project 
Strategies for Impact in Philanthropy, Case Study CSI TC 008, Heidelberg: Centre for 
Social Investment of Heidelberg University, p. 2. 
98 Ibid., p. 3. 
99 Ibid., p. 5. 
35 
unable to practice because their medical credentials were not formally 
recognized.100 
The official qualification recognition process was very demanding; if people 
had not trained in Portugal, they struggled with the required exam at the 
medical schools and with the language barrier during their mandatory 
hospital internships. Because the required internships were unpaid, they 
were also a financial burden to these immigrant doctors. The doctors not 
only had to work for free at a hospital, they were also unable to earn money 
at the same time to provide for themselves and their family. Furthermore, if 
immigrants were no longer in paid employment, the SEF (Foreigners and 
Borders Service) cancelled their residence permit. On top of these indirect 
costs, the direct costs of the recognition process were very high, including 
the costs of translation of documents, exam registration fees, and purchase 
of the required books.101 So instead of filling the gaps in the Portuguese 
health care system, many foreign doctors worked in low-wage positions for 
which they were extremely overqualified. 102 
The Foundation decided to spearhead an innovative project to solve this 
problem: “Portugal could be pro-active towards the influx of people this 
time, instead of just waiting and anticipating that the immigration problems 
will solve themselves.”103 
Design and Implementation 
The underlying idea of the project was to invest in an experimental, 
innovative initiative on a small scale, which could then be replicated by other 
organizations. The Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation risked potential failure 
but continued to improve the project design so that future projects would be 
less risky and able to serve a larger client base.104 The foundation worked 
with the Jesuit Refugee Service, an organization devoted to protecting the 
rights of refugees around the world. It supported around 5,000 immigrants 
in Portugal by offering language classes, personalized assistance during the 
search for employment and housing, and other face-to-face services like 
medical support and legal counselling. The Jesuit Refugee Service received 
external funds and relied heavily on the commitment of its experienced 
volunteers.105 
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In cooperation with the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, the Jesuit Refugee 
Service decided to give advice and support to 120 doctors in the first round of 
the project. 65 men and 55 women participated in the project. Of these, 62% 
were under the age of forty, 33% between forty and forty-nine, and only 5% 
over fifty years old. The majority of these foreign doctors came from Eastern 
Europe (91%).106 The project focused on two types of support: financial 
assistance that covered the costs of translation services, application and 
registration fees, professional literature and their expenditures during their 
internships (maximum 9 months); and social assistance, including language 
courses and psychological support. To further increase the project’s chances 
of success, the CGF cooperated with the Medical Council, medical schools’ 
boards, SEF (Foreigners and Borders Service) and the Ministry of Health. In 
addition, the media served an important role in the project; 107 positive press 
coverage increased public acceptance of the initiative. 
Outcome and Impact 
Of the 120 immigrant doctors supported by the project, 107 successfully 
entered the Portuguese National Health System – a success rate of nearly 
89%. However, the impact of the project can be measured in more than 
numbers. It had an invaluable impact on the doctors’ lives and families. The 
book Being a doctor again written by Ricardo Felner, one of the participating 
doctors, demonstrates the positive ways in which the project influenced the 
future of the project participants: they thrived in their profession, some 
brought their families to Portugal, others got married to Portuguese citizens, 
had children, or bought houses.108 Furthermore, the project had a more 
widespread positive impact on Portuguese society. It was an example of the 
successful integration of non-Portuguese speaking immigrants, influencing 
the attitudes of many Portuguese people who had previously been hostile to 
the influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe.109 
The project also introduced a more collaborative approach between the 
different agencies in the medical sector, for example between the medical 
schools and the Medical Council. It also led to a second project in 2008. The 
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation continued to manage the project but this 
time, the Ministry of Health covered the financial costs. An additional 150 
doctors received assistance from the Jesuit Refugee Service during their 
recognition process. 110 However, the success rate of this project was much 
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lower: only 67 of the immigrants completed all phases of the recognition 
process and were registered with the Portuguese Medical Association. 111 
One problem was that the Jesuit Refugee Service only worked on an 
individual level. A family-wide approach might have been more effective in 
integrating the doctors as well as their partners and children. More 
successful was the recognition of qualification of 59 immigrant nurses 
(2005-2006). 45 immigrant nurses passed their exams - a success rate of 
76%.112 
Success or Failure Factors 
The project was innovative but narrow in scope. It focused on one particular 
group of immigrants, who were highly qualified but struggling with 
recognition of their credentials.113 This narrow focus made it possible to tailor 
the project design to the specific needs of these clients. The project’s initial 
success may also be related to the fact that the Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation chose a very experienced partner organization (the Jesuit 
Refugee Service). 114 Their volunteers had in-depth knowledge of the required 
bureaucratic processes and on a personal level were well-equipped to 
support immigrants during hard times. 
Another important factor in the project’s success was the cooperation 
between the different agencies. With the help of the Jesuit Refugee Service, 
the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation identified all relevant partners and 
managed the cooperation between them; one result of this was that the 
Ministry of Health supported the initiative and agreed to integrate the 
successfully recognized doctors. Another result of the Foundation’s 
cooperative approach was that the SEF (Foreigners and Borders Service) 
agreed that immigrants should be able to maintain their residential permits 
during the recognition process, and as long as they were participating in the 
project, they were allowed to live legally in Portugal. In addition, the five 
national medical schools supported the project and worked together with 
the other partners to ensure its success.115 As mentioned before, the project 
also owes some of it success to the positive coverage in the media, which led 
to greater acceptance and integration of the immigrant doctors.116 
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Lessons Learned 
 Narrowly focused projects can identify and concentrate on what 
is important to their defined client group. 
 Involving key partners from the outset helps to overcome 
potential obstacles and ensures buy-in and ownership. 
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Compagnia di San Paolo, ITA 
Social Microcredit Programme 
Description of Specific Programme 
The Social Microcredit programme was an initiative by the Italian foundation 
Compagnia di San Paolo running from 2003 to 2009. It was the first project 
that introduced a microcredit scheme in an industrialized country. The 
objective of the programme was to support the entrepreneurial activities of 
“non-bankable” clients, who were incapable of offering their own 
guarantees and, therefore, unable to receive conventional banking loans. 117 
The goal of the project was to make these individuals “bankable” by offering 
funds and training. Through this project the foundation also planned to fight 
usury and to develop a micro-credit culture in Italy. 118  
The foundation divided € 1.6 million among four partner organizations who 
in turn established guarantee funds with local banks.119 The partner 
organizations were (1) the Fondazione Antiusura Santa Maria del Soccorso, 
Genoa, (2) the Fondazione Don Mario Operti Onlus, Turin, (3) the Fondazione 
San Giusepe Moscati, Naples, and (4) the Fondazione Riorsa Donna, Rome. 120 
In addition to the guarantee funds, the foundation supported the partner 
organizations with € 160.000 annually for the overall management, 
administrative costs and external evaluation fees.121 The cooperating banks 
were two banks of Intesa San Paolo banking group, Sanpaolo IMI and 
Sanpaolo Banco di Napoli122 
Origins and Rationale 
The foundation is rooted in a long banking tradition. It was founded in Turin 
in 1563 as a charitable lay brotherhood. The pawnshop “Monte di Pietà” 
served as the financial backbone for the operating charities. In the 17th and 
18th centuries, the brotherhood’s importance grew when influential 
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members of the court and government joined or made bequests to the 
organization. By 1900, “Monte di Pietà” was a fully functioning credit 
institution offering a wide range of account services – loans based on 
pledges counted for less than 10% of the business. During the Fascist Regime, 
the organization was an important pillar of the national economy and 
renamed San Paolo di Torino, Credito e Beneficienza (Credit and 
Philanthropy). After World War II, the organization was considered a banking 
institution with philanthropic initiatives.123  
In the wake of the Amato-Carli Act 1991, Italian banks had to be rationalized 
and privatized. The act required banks to separate their charitable activities 
and their lending businesses. As a result, the Compagnia di San Paolo 
became an independent foundation with its own philanthropic mission. 
However, the micro-credit initiative is an impressive example of the 
foundation’s roots in the banking industry. The programme is based on the 
ideas that even industrialized countries may profit from micro-credit services 
– they only have to be differently organized and implemented from those in 
developing countries124. The foundation hoped to use the initiative as a 
pioneer programme, not only to improve the lives of individuals, but also to 
demonstrate its feasibility. The project was supposed to serve as a social 
experiment, which could be implemented on a larger scale in the future.125 
Design and Implementation 
The project was based on a semi-franchise system. The four partner 
organizations worked on a local level where they could profit from their 
knowledge of the city and its people. The cities were chosen based on their 
specific characteristics: Turin as an industrial city, Genoa with its large 
percentage of immigrants, Naples with lacking opportunities for young 
people, and finally Rome, which had a large number of entrepreneurial 
women as possible clients.126 Compagnia di San Paolo granted € 400.000 to 
each of the NGOs and in 2003 the partner organizations launched their 
micro-credit project almost simultaneously. 
The clients (individuals, partnerships, social cooperatives) had to apply to one 
of the four local organizations, which evaluated their requests. In case of a 
positive assessment, the application was transmitted to the bank that then 
completed the evaluation and granted appropriate loans. The minimum 
loans ranged from € 500 to € 2.000 to start up and develop a business, 
maximum loans ranged from € 20.000 to € 35.000, for individuals and 
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groups respectively. Monthly instalments were paid over a minimum of 18 
months up to a maximum of 60 months.127 
In case of default or insolvency, the grants by the Compagnia di San Paolo 
were used to guarantee funds. Beginning in February 2005, the banks 
applied “a ratio “1 to 2” between the guarantee fund and the overall loans”. 
128 Each repayment of a loan made the equivalent sum available for another, 
new loan (rolling fund). 129 As a social programme the interest rates were 
considerably lower than the market rates and the terms of repayment were 
negotiable.  
Examples of projects approved and financed:  
o Start-up of African items shop in Turin 
o Start-up of call centre in Genoa 
o Start-up of day nursery in Rome 
o Start-up of language school in Naples130 
Outcome and Impact 
Due to the economic crisis, the need for credit was growing significantly 
during the duration of the project. 131 In March 2009, Turin had processed 636 
requests, Genoa 167, Rome 191 and Naples 224.132 The percentage of approved 
requests differed significantly between the different locations. While in 
Rome and Genoa almost half of the applications were approved (45% and 
42% respectively), in Turin and Naples the majority was rejected and only a 
small percentage approved (21% and 16% respectively). There is also a large 
inconsistency in the percentages of loans paid down with no delay -Turin 
(40%), Genoa (33%), Rome (81%), Naples (42%) - and the insolvency rates - 
Turin (31%), Genoa (33%), Rome (13%), Naples (38%).133 
Yet, the foundations struggled to achieve their main objective: to enable 
their clients to became “bankable” and more integrated into a market 
structure. Instead of helping their clients, the clients were often branded as 
receivers of loans from the foundation and subsequently not able to get 
traditional loans.134  
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Nevertheless, the project served as a forerunner to the larger micro-credit 
initiative, which was launched in 2014: the “Regional Guarantee for 
Microcredit Fund”. It brings together key players of the Piemonte to create a 
regional network. Project partners are, among others, the Fondazione Don 
Mario Operti, which is a leader of a network of non-profit organizations 
working in the region, and the Confcommercio Piemonte, a network of 
employers’ associations. The new initiative is financed in varying degrees by 
Regione Piemonte, Compagnia di San Paolo, Unioncamere Piemonte and 
Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Cuneo. In total € 4.030.000 serve as funds 
for the second micro-credit programme. Furthermore, Compagnia has 
recently become part of the share portfolio of PerMicro Spa, a microcredit 
company characterized by social aims and by a strong link with the region.135 
Success or Failure Factors 
The biggest success factor was the network of reliable project partners, 
which dealt with local operations (selection of applicants, funding request to 
be delivered to the banks, training and coaching offered to the beneficiaries, 
follow-up and consultancy).136 They could draw from rich experience and 
knowledge: two project partners were already committed to the fight 
against usury, three out of four were religious-based organizations with 
strong social networks, and all organizations were strongly rooted in the 
territory in which they operate.137 The semi-franchise system made it possible 
for the project partners to act individually and to incorporate changes if 
necessary.138 
Furthermore, all organizations had strong human resource strategies: 
volunteers assessed the applications and consulted as well as trained the 
clients. These volunteers were experts in the fields of banking, finance, 
entrepreneurship, and business consultancy. They devoted their free time to 
support the micro-credit programme and to help others to achieve their 
business goals. The commitment of these experts increased the percentage 
of loans repaid significantly and contributed considerably to the success of 
the project. 139 
The most important success factor was that beneficiaries were given a tool 
not a ready-made solution. The clients were not left alone to start their 
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business. Instead, they received extensive training and counselling by 
experts to achieve their goals.140 
Lessons Learned 
 Experienced and reliable partners make successful projects 
possible. 
 Expert knowledge is indispensable when working on an 
innovative project. 
 Tools and not solutions help people to become pro-active and to 
empower them to achieve their goals. 
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Eberhard von Kuenheim Foundation, DEU 
A New Start for Theresienthal 
Description of Specific Programme 
The Kristallglasmanufaktur Theresienthal is one of the best-known 
producers of crystal glass in Germany.141 In 2001, the factory was closed after 
its second insolvency in only two years.142 A year later, the Eberhard von 
Kuenheim Foundation began to create a strong network of over 60 different 
partners, including the former employees, to revive the company. The 
commitment of former employees to rebuild Theresienthal was exceptional 
and as a result, by their own efforts, they were able to re-enter the labor 
market. In cooperation with the Deutsche Bank Foundation the “Stiftung 
Theresientahl” was established in 2004 to restart the company. Two years 
later, a local investor took over the glass manufacturer.143 Despite the 
difficult world economic situation, the Kristallglasmanufaktur Theresienthal 
continues its successful history. 
Origins and Rationale 
Theresienthal was founded in 1836 and quickly became one of the most 
prestigious glass manufacturers in the world. By the 1950s, over 300 
employees produced exquisite glass for the German, European and 
international markets. The decline of the company began in the 1960s when 
its handmade, labour-intensive glassware was failing to compete with much 
cheaper mass-produced goods. In the 1980s and 1990s the company declined 
even further: it continuously reduced its workforce and was resold twice. 
After two insolvencies in 2000 and 2001, Theresienthal finally closed its 
doors.144 
Although the glass manufacturer was closed, former employees remained 
loyal to their long-term employer. They continued to check if everything was 
in order, repaired broken windows and equipment, and continued to sell 
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unsold stock to pay for the maintenance of the company. 145 In 2002, the 
foundation lawyer Peter Lax introduced the CEO of the Eberhard von 
Kuenheim Foundation, Christoph Glaser, to Max Hannes, who was one of the 
former employees taking care of the factory. Max Hannes had worked at 
Theresienthal for almost 40 years and his passion for the traditions of the 
company inspired Christoph Glaser – it seemed like a promising opportunity 
for the Eberhard von Kuenheim Foundation.146 
The Foundation was established in 2000 by the BMW Group to support 
people who “think and act entrepreneurially with a sense of responsibility”. 
The focus is, in particular, on regions that are economically less developed.147 
Theresienthal combined both of these factors. On the one hand, the former 
employees were passionate, highly-qualified and resourceful. On the other 
hand, the region of Lower Bavaria where the factory was based was in 
economic decline. The closing of Theresienthal was symptomatic of a 
struggling region. A successful revival of the glass manufacturer could 
forcefully demonstrate that entrepreneurship could be done in the most 
unlikely places. The Foundation decided to take on the challenge of re-
inventing Theresienthal. 
Design and Implementation 
During the design phase of the project multiple factors became clear: the 
factory had to be revived as a profitable company, not as a museum to 
preserve the traditions of the region. It should not have to rely on subsidies – 
whether by the Foundation or through public funding. To make this possible, 
the former employees, with their specific knowledge, had to return to 
Theresienthal and play an integral role in the re-development of the 
company. One of the first tasks was to focus on the Theresienthal brand.148 
The name and its reputation for quality would serve as the basis for 
Theresienthal’s future. 
As well as supporting the development of the project and advising the 
people on site, the Foundation's main role was to bring project partners 
together and establish a strong network to support the venture.149 Experts 
from other businesses, foundations, non-profit organizations as well as 
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representatives of state agencies joined the former employees in their fight 
for Theresienthal .150 The 60 project partners included the local employment 
office, the Hertie and Deutsche Bank Foundations, consulting firms and 
many others.151 All these partners volunteered to support Theresienthal and 
did not receive any payment or stocks in the future company.152 
Outcome and Impact 
The project’s main achievement was the revival of Theresienthal. The factory 
is running once again and over 20 employees were able to return to their 
former workplace.153 In addition, the project demonstrated the potential of 
the Foundation’s strategy to foster entrepreneurship in a very unlikely place 
under difficult circumstances. Equally important, it was an example of the 
power of values over conventional market theory. It was not maximization of 
profits but the focus on tradition and quality that led to success.154 
In 2006 a local family acquired Theresienthal; the new owner, Max von 
Schnurbein, holds 90 percent of shares and the Theresienthal Foundation 
holds the remaining 10 percent.155 In 2006 and 2007, the revenues increased 
each year by 20 percent.156 However, the global financial and economic crisis 
did not spare the newly re-established company: 2009 was the most difficult 
year for the company. The employees had to work shorter hours and the 
revenue dropped to under € 1 million. 157 Theresienthal recovered and is still 
successful. Today it makes almost one-third of its profit outside of Europe, 
with Russia as its biggest market.158 
The documentarian Dominik Wessely accompanied the project at all stages 
for over 2 years. He produced a movie based on his experience “Die 
Unzerbrechlichen” (The Unbreakables)159 and published a book together with 
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Christoph Glaser about the development, implementation and outcomes of 
the project “Unternehmen statt unterlassen: Von der ungewöhnlichen 
Rettung eines Traditionsbetriebs” (Acting instead of retraining: about the 
exceptional rescue of a traditional company).160 Through the book and movie, 
more people learned about this unusual initiative and its underlying values. 
It inspired others to contact the Foundation and project partners and to dare 
similar activities.161 
Success or Failure Factors 
At the start, the project appeared very high risk for the Eberhard von 
Kuenheim Foundation. The foundation lacked any knowledge regarding the 
glass industry and the legal requirements of re-starting an old factory;162 its 
financial resources were overextended. The Boston Consulting Group 
estimated that it would cost up to € 10 million to re-start Theresienthal. The 
Foundation simply did not have enough money to sustain the company until 
it was profitable.163 Nevertheless, what the Foundation lacked in financial 
resources and expert knowledge it made up for with its unique position as 
an independent, altruistic organization. 
Because of its organizational structure, the Eberhard von Kuenheim 
Foundation was independent of members or owners. It could take higher 
risks without worrying about the threat of losing the confidence of clients or 
investors and it could think long term. At the same time, foundations are not 
self-interested: they do not aim to create profit or grow their business. 
Because their sole purpose is to benefit others, they are more likely to be 
considered reliable partners.164 The other project partners trusted the 
Foundation to act in the common interest without exploiting anyone of the 
partners, or pursuing its own gain. The Foundation’s credibility was further 
heightened by its close relationship to the BMW Group. As one of the largest 
employers in the region, BMW was held in high esteem.165 
This trust was essential because the project’s success depended on a well-
functioning network. The first project partners involved had already worked 
with the Foundation and shared its norms and values. They, in turn, talked to 
some of their close business or project partners who then gave their support 
to Theresienthal. In this way, the network grew stronger and wider. 
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Meanwhile, the Foundation made sure that the project was open to all 
interested parties and the relationships between the different partners 
conflict-free.166 The Foundation further fostered cooperation with informal 
updates and social events.167  
Lessons Learned  
 Entrepreneurship can be done anywhere, even in a century-old 
glass factory in an economically depressed region.168 
 Because of their financial independence and neutrality, 
foundations are in a strong position to foster networks and 
collaboration thus extending their financial and non-financial 
resources. 
 Foundations’ lack of dependence on shareholders, customers or 
constituents enables them to take risks other institutions might 
be wary of. 
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Fondazione Cariplo, ITA 
Social Housing 
Description of Specific Programme 
Fondazione Housing Soziale’s (FHS) first began working on the issue of social 
housing in 2000 in order to support the most vulnerable members of the 
population. After several years of writing grants, it realized that the limited 
amount of resources it could provide were not a long-term solutions to a 
structural problem. In 2004, it decided to take a more innovative and 
sustainable approach based on ethical investments and partnerships with 
other public and private institutions. What initially started as a programme 
under the foundation developed into its own foundation, “Fondazione 
Housing Sociale” (or “FHS”).169 Through this foundation, it focused on four 
main points: 
o Promoting ethical financial initiatives and real estate funds 
dedicated solely to social housing 
o Testing innovative management models for non-profits 
o Developing instruments for project design for the entire housing 
sector 
o Developing a public-private partnership for coordinate initiatives 
with existing house policies. 
In addition to housing, FHS works on ethical investment real estate, urban 
renewal, neighbourhood building, welfare housing, the environment, as well 
as mission-related investments and exercises in cross-sector cooperation and 
service provision. 
Origins and Rationale 
The Italian housing market underwent considerable change in the 1990’s. 
Rising housing demands from students, temporary workers, immigrants, and 
single-parent families were met with housing costs that rose faster than 
household incomes. People falling under these categories had incomes but 
could not afford the rent prices in the open market. To make matters worse, 
they also did not qualify for public housing, which was only accessible to the 
poorest households. Thus the public housing sector, which was still in its 
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infancy, was unable to meet the demands of this income category.170 FHS 
therefore stepped in to address this “grey area of housing demanders”.171 
At the time, Cariplo was active in the social housing field. Over the course of 
ten years, Cariplo granted €39 million to around 200 projects.172 After it was 
clear that grants were insufficient to fully address the problem, the 
Foundation decided to follow a radically different course and created FHS in 
2004 to continue developing the social housing programme. FHS became 
part of a complex system of local and eventually national funds, including 
institutional investors (key Italian foundations, banks, insurance companies, 
etc.), local investors (small foundations, cooperatives, local public bodies, 
private real estate investors, etc.) and management companies, all of which 
were strictly regulated by the Italian Central Bank.173 
FHS had 4 main areas, namely (1) promoting ethical financing initiatives, 
especially real estate funds for social housing, (2) testing new non-profit 
management models, (3) developing project designs to disseminate and 
potentially replicate, and (4) building public–private partnerships to 
coordinate initiatives with existing public housing policies. It aimed not 
simply to provide a place to live but rather foster a way of living in which 
multiple services are shared and a community is nurtured.174 
Design and Implementation 
First, the Foundation asked Milan Polytechnic University to develop a 
feasibility study of an autonomous, sustainable system that would provide a 
variety of social housing options. In 2003, the feasibility study was 
completed. One year later, Cariplo partnered with Regione Lombardia and 
ANCI Lombardia (public bodies), and created FHS to experiment with 
innovative solutions for structuring, financing, constructing, and managing 
social housing initiatives that were economically sustainable and 
independent of grants. They defined social housing as “the set of dwellings 
and services, actions and instruments addressed to those who are unable to 
meet their housing and related primary needs on the open market for 
economic reasons or due to a lack of appropriate supply options.”175 
Therefore, FHS focused its efforts on those who had annual incomes of 
€12,000–50,000 but could not afford open market housing rates. Public 
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sector housing, on the other hand, is primarily for those with annual incomes 
below €12,000. 176  
FHS had an eight-person board of directors drawn from its main partners 
(including Cariplo). Initially, Cariplo covered only FHS’s set-up and operating 
costs. However, they later gave FHS a €10 million endowment to subsidize 
FHS’s income from fees for technical services (architectural, service design, 
business planning, etc.). 
FHS began to develop a sustainable business model for social housing 
initiatives by starting the first real estate ethical fund in Italy, “Fondo 
Federale Immobiliare di Lombardia” (FIL). Investors were offered returns 3% 
above inflation (capped at 4%) on long-term, 20-year investments. This was 
considered very low but was marketed as a social investment. Eventually, 
nine high-profile public and private organizations agreed to invest, with the 
first fund closing at €85 million. The name and reputation of the Foundation 
were considered a critical factor in FIL’s initial success. The National Housing 
Plan later used this success to set up a national Integrated Funds System 
(SIF). 177 
FHS approached social housing development as a partnership between 
public and private entities. It envisioned its role as a supervisor that would 
see projects completed, share knowledge, and ensure competence, thereby 
creating a market rather than a collection of projects. Housing developments 
combined urban and environmental planning, high-impact social and 
commercial services, and occasionally special residential services. Ideally, 
both local stakeholders and investors would agree on these elements at the 
outset so they could be included in the implementation contract prior to 
finalizing the building design and development, property allocation, and 
property and community management.178  
FHS was involved with the renovation of an old building in the centre of 
Milan, which was privately owned and rented out to tenants. The building 
was in a culturally-diverse area and designed to include existing residents, 
migrants, young people, and people with disabilities. FHS invested €7 million 
in renovating a park behind the building for neighbourhood use. Two 
commercial spaces in the building were allocated to a fair trade coffee outlet 
and clothing recycling centre/boutique. The tenants for the commercial 
spaces were chosen to help the broader goal of regenerating the 
neighbourhood. The building management was another experiment. To 
encourage the involvement of non-profit organizations in social housing, 
Fondazione Cariplo granted four organizations €1.5 million to form a 
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consortium and set up a social enterprise to buy part of and manage the 
building.179 
Outcome and Impact 
FHS provides diverse social housing options for low-income tenants. More 
fundamentally, it created an effective and sustainable business model for 
social housing initiatives, created the first real estate ethical fund in Italy, 
challenged established real estate markets, and provided a model for the 
National Housing Plan to create the SIF.180  
Success or Failure Factors 
FHS’s success has been attributed to many factors, including:181 
o A vision beyond grant-making 
o Willingness to take risks on innovative models 
o Planning and commissioning a feasibility study 
o Skilful use of the Foundation’s reputation to gain access to and 
influence potential investors 
o Willingness to oppose the established real estate market 
o Persistence and patience in pursuing partnerships with private and 
public entities 
o A focus on the ‘social’ aspect of social housing 
o A refusal to equate low cost housing with low quality housing 
o Continuous improvement 
o Development of a dynamic and repeatable model 
Challenging aspects of the program were: 
o Reconciling its dual identity of an economic enterprise on the one 
hand and an institutional enterprise on the other. While it needed to 
instil a sense of confidence and long-term stability in its investors, it 
needed to be innovative in finding the best public-private 
partnership model to meet the needs of those left behind in the 
“grey area” of housing. 182 
o Encouraging different stakeholders with different incentives 
towards common goals. FHS needed to be attractive to private 
stakeholder but also be fully embedded in the local welfare 
system.183 
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o Developing sustainable management models that can be replicated 
in contexts other than Lombardy or Milan.184 
o Ensuring an integrated approach. In order to mould sustainable 
communities, housing initiative are urban, social, and financial 
projects at the same time. A “social manager” not only provides 
important community services, but also improves the risk-
performance ration for investors.185 
 
Lessons Learned 
 A foundation’s name and reputation can exert considerable 
influence and provide access to influential networks. 
 Working cooperatively with public and private bodies can be very 
powerful. 
 A foundation’s willingness to take risks on innovation and challenge 
entrenched interests can foster real change. 
 A foundat ion’s abilit y to m ake long-term plans can determine 
whether ambitious projects reach their goals. 
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Freudenberg Foundation, DEU 
Service Learning 
Description of Specific Programme 
Service-Learning – (S-L), also known as Learning through Civic Engagement 
(Lernen durch Engagement), is a teaching and learning method that 
combines formal instruction with relevant civic engagement for students186. 
Children and adolescents get involved in civil service projects for the 
common good, usually related to social, ecological, political or cultural 
endeavours. While providing a service that is deemed beneficial to society, 
they benefit from gaining democratic and practical experience that often 
allows students to apply lessons-learned from the classroom. 
S-L/Lernen durch Engagement was initiated in Germany in 2001 via a pilot 
project of the Freudenberg Stiftung called Verantwortung Lernen. Within a 
span of eight months, S-L was tested at ten schools, under the leadership of 
Dr. Anne Sliwka. Schools were selected based on distinct differences in 
location, type (Haupt-, Real-, Gesamtschule, or Gymnasium187) and degree of 
pre-existing experience with service learning. Each school had an 
“innovation team” that consisted of at least two teachers/managers, two 
students, a parent representative, and a representative from one of the local 
partner organizations whenever possible. These teams received training to 
form a regional S-L representative and were responsible for implementing 
the programme. Each school was free to develop a service project of its 
choice, with themes varying from the construction of community gardens, to 
offering computer courses and hiking trips for senior citizens.188  
The specific goals listed by the foundation are to: 
o Teach students and teachers democratic and social competence. 
o Teach students how to put their knowledge into practice in a 
productive manner.  
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o Help students become more motivated, self-assured and effective, 
while improving their attitude towards school. 
o Promote more openness towards the community, develop a climate 
of cooperation and strengthen individual student support.  
The programme is financed by Freudenberg Foundation, the Siemens 
Foundation (since 2014), the Deutsche Bahn Foundation (since 2015), the 
Federal Ministry of Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth 
(sponsored training courses for teaching assistants , throughout Germany 
from 2012-2014). Community Foundations, volunteer organizations, and 
“RAAs” (regional centres for issues regarding foreigners, school and youth 
work in the new German states and the promotion of children and 
adolescents from immigrant families in North-Rhine Westfphalia) served as 
“competence centres” and were responsible for their own fundraising.189 As 
of 2013, there are some 150 schools in Germany that employ this method.190 
The S-L programme represents and promotes Service Learning to the 
stakeholders of education, youth, and civil engagement policies in Germany. 
Origins and Rationale 
Serving Learning is an educational approach originating from the progressive 
and pragmatic movements in the US. Progressivism in education was 
popularized by John Dewey and emphasized the importance of hands-on 
learning, while pragmatism was pioneered by William James and focused on 
the practical applicability of education. Combined, these philosophies make 
up the core components of service learning. S-L has been established in the 
U.S. since the 1960s, later having gained some popularity in Germany as well. 
Service Learning began to become popular in German primary and secondary 
schools in the 1990s. It then caught on in post-secondary schools about a 
decade later, although similar concepts had already been in place at practice-
oriented schools of applied sciences. S-L became more widely adopted in 
higher education when Germany transitioned to the Bachelor/Master 
system. 
The foundation conceived of the service-learning project as an important 
component of its programme area Democratic Culture in School and 
Communities / “Demokratische Kultur in Schulen und Gemeinden.” 
Moreover, the concept is closely related to the goals of the Freudenberg 
Foundation, in particularly with regard to strengthening democracy, 
integration and participation of all members of society and “learning and 
experiencing democratic culture from as early an age as possible.”191 
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Design and Implementation 
For all of its projects, the Freudenberg foundation cooperates with 
government institutions and other foundations. In order to promote learning 
through civic engagement, the programme has built an association of 
Service Learning schools and regional partners in fifteen German federal 
states. The partner organizations, which function as competence centres, 
assist schools throughout the region to add S-L to their curriculum and assist 
with implementing the programmes. As part of their mentoring services, 
they provide teaching materials based on research and on practical 
experiences. These include quality standards that are used to evaluate 
different approaches and determine whether a curriculum should be revised. 
This teaching method is not only used in K-12 education, but also in 
universities and colleges. At the postgraduate level, this is particularly 
relevant for the students who are training to become teachers. Service 
learning in higher education largely began at the University of Mannheim, 
and the Freudenberg foundation played a pivotal role in the expansion of 
this initiative.  
Outcome and Impact 
Thanks to the Freudenberg Foundation’s pilot project, the nation-wide 
network Lernen durch Engagement was developed. At the end of the pilot, all 
schools involved had declared a readiness to further develop service learning 
and to work towards expanding the S-L network; however, the pilot project 
failed to create an impact beyond the specific partner schools.192 At the same 
time, it has strong potential to expand, as it is only at the “pioneer stage” in 
Germany.193 The ultimate goal is to create systemic changes in Germany’s 
education system,194 which has not yet been achieved. 
During the assessment phase, schools found that the project helped improve 
class cohesion and provided students with a sense of ownership. Its biggest 
shortcoming was that students did not have enough say in choosing a 
project, which led to a lack of motivation in some students. Moreover, many 
of the external partners were not familiar enough with the concept, and 
understood S-L to be equivalent to an internship. If S-L was to be 
implemented on a larger scale, then it was clear that there needed to be 
improvements to the process.195  
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In 2013, Holger Backhaus-Maul and Christiane Roth published a book to 
evaluate service learning in post-secondary education. They are the first to 
take inventory of this approach, ten years after schools began implementing 
it. They found that within ten years, S-L became a component of many 
educational institutions throughout Germany. In colleges, it was 
implemented for subjects ranging from political science to engineering. 
About 15% of all post-secondary schools (56 of 368) use a form of S-L.  
The number of higher education institutions that use S-L is still relatively 
small. Of the 368 surveyed post-secondary schools, 129 said they explicitly 
chose not to offer Service Learning. The most common reason for this was 
the lack of prominence of this concept. Other reasons for this are that 
universities do not have the human resources to develop S-L programmes, 
and that many students already work and do not need the practical 
experience.196  
Success or Failure Factors 
Compared to other service projects, research has demonstrated that Service-
learning is particularly beneficial for disadvantaged and underserved 
students.197 Since it is integrated into school curricula, it gives students that 
would normally not engage in community service the opportunity to do so 
and discover it for themselves. The German national education report from 
2010 states that 20% of students at a lower educational level volunteer, 
whereas 50% of the students at the higher level do. Service-learning is 
working towards closing this discrepancy to provide equal opportunities for 
service and learning.198  
One of the major challenges has been the sustainability of the programme. 
There are about 40.000 schools in the country, and the Service-Learning 
network only knows about 100 to 200 schools that are involved in S-L 
projects.199 Part of this problem with wider adoption is that a project cannot 
simply be replicated from one location to another. Each programme needs to 
cater to the specific needs of a school and its surrounding community, which 
takes much time and effort to develop. For instance, administrators must 
ensure that a program is “closely integrated into the curriculum, involves 
cognitively challenging reflection activities, incorporates students’ voices in 
decision making, fosters diversity, includes monitoring of progress, has a 
significant duration, develops reciprocal partnerships with community 
partners, and requires students to participate in meaningful service.”200 
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There is no such thing as a “one size fits all” approach in this kind of learning, 
since both the students and the community should mutually benefit from 
the experience.  
Even though the expansion of sustainability of service learning has been 
challenging, Freudenberg’s pilot project inspired several other projects that 
followed and became part of school curricula. For instance, the WGZ Bank 
cooperative (owned by Aktive Bürgerschaft e.V.) sponsored a project an S-L 
project called sozialgenial – schüler engagieren sich, which was supported by 
the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training in North Rhine 
Westphalia. The programme has been running since 2009 and has been 
implemented in 500 schools.201 
While S-L was implemented in many schools, the quality from one 
programme to another varied widely. Sandra Zentner, who is the contact 
person for this programme, notes that “one of the most important 
challenges is to develop and sustain high quality service-learning 
projects.”202 At the end of the experiment in 2007, many schools had adopted 
service-learning, but lacked high quality standards and had trouble 
distinguishing between specialized service-learning and community service.  
This was troublesome, given that the success of a programme is primarily 
rooted in the quality of its implementation. Moreover: the link between the 
theoretical and applied learning was not always well established. For 
instances, in some cases, students engaged in work that was unrelated to 
their class curricula.203 This led to question about the overall rationale behind 
service learning. 
Backhaus-Maul and Christiane Roth note that the beginning of S-L in post-
secondary schools coincides with a time when universities and colleges were 
seeking ways to economize. It is unclear whether the implementation of S-L 
was a product of this, or if schools were engaging in a trend that would 
improve their profiles and allow them to become more innovative. Thus 
there is the question whether the motivation of schools engaged in S-L is 
properly places. 
The ways in which schools decided to engage in this programme varied 
widely; some took a top-down approach (e.g. Hochschule Ludwigshafen am 
Rhein), while others took a more grassroots approach (e.g Universität 
Mannheim). Some schools created their own S-L centres, and in other cases, 
decisions were entirely left to S-L protagonists. The reason for implementing 
S-L programmes greatly diverged as well; some saw it as a way to build 
professional qualifications, while others felt it was a tool to develop social 
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competences. Surveys and interviews revealed that the service learning 
functioned best when it was diffused from within, rather than imposed from 
outside or above. The ‘societal impulse’ for civil engagement seems to hold 
strongest in these cases, even though society and academia traditionally 
remain separate, unless the focus of study is a socially-oriented.204 
Questions that remain to be addressed are the extent to which the 
curriculum prepares students for their service, whether students are actively 
engaged in the selection of their civic engagement, whether schools are 
prioritizing the development of competences, and whether teachers are 
working to foster positive relationships with the partner institutions.205 In 
the end, effective service-learning is not just about “getting youth engaged 
in their community.” It needs to follow the logic of a curriculum, create 
opportunities for “cognitively challenging reflection activities,” solicit the 
views and opinions of the students, encourage diversity, monitoring 
progress, and develops partnerships with communities that are reciprocal 
and mutually beneficial. 
Lessons Learned  
 Although a project may have been successfully implemented in one 
location, success if far from guaranteed somewhere else. Context 
matters.  
 Before a program is implemented, the administrators should have a 
proven understanding of the rationale and added benefit to all 
stakeholders.  
 Questions have quality should be intricately linked to assessments 
of programmatic success.  
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Fryshuset, SWE 
Easy Street (“Lugna Gatan”) Programme 
Description of Specific Programme 
In 1995, the Swedish Fryshuset foundation initiated the Lugna Gatan 
Programme to reduce violence and crime among young people in 
Stockholm’s most segregated neighbourhoods.206 Instead of relying on 
trained social workers or security personnel to curb criminal activities, the 
foundation decided to employ young, unemployed adults from the same 
neighbourhoods. Because they shared the same, often immigrant, 
background and life experiences as many of the young perpetrators, they 
were able to gain the trust of at-risk teenagers. They “knew the language of 
the street” but also served as viable role models for the young.207 The 
programme focused first on vandalism, violence and crime in Stockholm’s 
subway system. Over the next years, the programme was expanded to 
include initiatives in schools and personal protection of young victims. The 
name “Lugna Gatan” was taken from the silent movie “Easy Street” (1917) in 
which Charlie Chaplin first rehabilitates himself and then transforms a 
whole street. 208 
Origins and Rationale 
In 1984, the YMCA of Stockholm and a group of supporters founded 
Fryshuset, which is today one of the largest youth centers in the world. In the 
1980s, the center was located in a former cold-storage warehouse (Fryshuset 
in Swedish). A few years later, the youth organization moved to a larger 
building in the South of Stockholm.209 In its early years, Fryshuset mainly 
offered social activities for children and teenagers, for example, sport 
courses and music classes. When youth riots and juvenile crime spiked in the 
mid-1980s, the organization, supported by the Swedish government, also 
focused on anti-violence and anti-crime initiatives.210 Yet, in 1995 the youth 
violence and crime escalated in the city and threatened to ruin one of 
Stockholm’s largest festivals. The organizers of the festival, the executive 
director of the public transport system and multiple high-ranking politicians 
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decided that something needed to be done to curb the violence and to make 
the city safe again.211 
At this point, Fryshuset was already well known for its crime prevention 
programmes and its work with disadvantaged children and teenagers.212 So, 
they were formally approached to develop a programme to reduce the 
violence and crime among young people in the most deprived areas of 
Stockholm. The goal was not only to make Stockholm’s street safer, but also 
to integrate these young people in the Swedish society.213 To develop this 
project, Fryshuset was able to draw from the “Non-Fighting Generation” 
programme, which enabled young former street fighters to work against 
violence.214 However, while this programme was extremely successful, it 
mainly focused on teenagers. Once these teenagers left school, many faced 
unemployment and became involved in drugs and crime. Fryshuset decided 
to base its new initiative “Lugna Gatan” on these struggling young people.215 
Design and Implementation 
The project “Lugna Gatan” evolved over four specific phases. First, young 
disadvantaged adults were employed in 1995 to patrol Stockholm’s 
underground system. These “stewards” or “hosts” mediated conflicts, 
intervened to prevent crime and build a close relationship with at-risk 
teenagers who were meeting and hanging out in the subway stations.216 In 
1997, the project expanded to include initiatives at schools which were 
having massive problems with vandalism, drugs, violence, and harassment. 
Again, young adults were employed to monitor student behavior and to 
cooperate with them to improve their school environment. Only a year later, 
this school project was broadened to include the students’ socially deprived 
neighbourhoods. With the help of Fryshuset employees, teenagers between 
fourteen and twenty, so called “Juniors”, had the opportunity to organize 
social activities and to form street patrols to prevent crime and conflicts. 
Beginning in 1999, “Lugna Gatan” also offered protection services to young 
individuals. The project “Home Visits” supported children and teenagers that 
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felt threatened or unsafe. In some cases, Fryshuset employees even served as 
bodyguards.217 
The most integral part of the “Lugna Gatan” project was its employees. 
Fryshuset fostered “leadership among those who earlier represented the 
problem.”218 The young adults were highly integrated into their 
neighbourhoods and had large social networks. Many came from an 
immigrant background and had their own experiences with crime, violence 
and drugs. Because of their experiences earlier in life, they could relate to 
marginalized teenagers who in turn trusted them.219 However, before 
someone could become a “steward”, they had to distance themselves from 
the use of violence and pass multiple unannounced drug tests.220 This was 
followed by a short training period, which was run in cooperation with local 
high schools and the police.221 Self-defence, first aid, conflict resolution and 
anger management were part of their training schedule, but also human 
rights and moral training.222 After the training the young “stewards” began 
their work in the streets, subway stations and schools of Stockholm.223 
Around 5 % of Fryshuset’s activities are covered by public funding; the other 
95 % are financed through grants, donations and fees for services. “Lugna 
Gatan” works like a free contractor. Companies and organizations, like the 
Stockholm transport authority, local business associations and authorities, 
pay for its services.224 
Outcome and Impact 
The “Lugna Gatan” had a big social impact. It employed many young adults 
who lacked job opportunities before and in many cases had turned to drug 
dealing and other criminal activities to support their livelihood. Instead, the 
programme offered training and work experience and can, therefore, also be 
understood as a “labour market programme”.225 But not only did the promise 
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of a safe income motivate the participants, many former criminals joined the 
programme to help teenagers to make better choices than they did.226 For 
example, the “Lugna Gatan” team members convinced teenagers of the 
importance of a formal school education. In one case, seven truants who 
missed classes 80 percent of the time started going to school regularly and 
improved their grades from 30 to 200 points. One policeman concluded: 
“They are very competent and a great help. They meet the youths on their 
own terms”.227 
The programmes impact on crime rates is more contested. According to 
Fryshuset, vandalism and crime in Stockholm’s subway stations had fallen 
up to 80 percent in the first year of the programme. However, an external 
evaluation concluded that crime rates did not only drop in the patrolled 
stations but were overall declining – even in the uncontrolled stations. At the 
same time, multiple problems emerged: the project depended on young 
adults who came from the most deprived areas of Stockholm. Many had 
connections to the criminal scene and had difficulties cutting the ties to their 
former lives. As a result, “Lugna Gatan” employees became repeatedly 
suspects in connection with drug delicts, sexual assaults or illegal weapon 
charges. This severely damaged the credibility of the project.228 Some even 
questioned the legality of the services. “Lugna Gatan” had no authorization 
to run a security company or personal protection business. In particular the 
“Home Visit” project operated in a grey area.229 
Overall, however, the media coverage and public debate of the project was 
mainly positive. Large Swedish newspapers published articles praising 
“Lugna Gatan” as a successful anti-youth-crime project. Representatives of 
the project were considered experts with a special knowledge on youth 
criminality that the police and social services lacked. They were often invited 
to share their experiences on national television and radio, for example after 
a young immigrant was killed in a notorious inner city neighbourhood. 230 
Members of Fryshuset were also invited to speak at police academies, in 
schools and universities. Anders Carlberg, the founder of Fryshuset, 
estimated that he “held speeches for 100,000 people in total”.231 Ulf 
Adelsohn, County Governor in Stockholm, stated that “Lugna Gatan” was 
“the most important occupational, social and youth work that he had ever 
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participated in”.232 Even the financial impact of the programme was 
discussed. A place in a juvenile institution cost around one million Swedish 
crowns (€ 107,000) a year – money that could possibly be saved due to this 
project.233 
The programme became also an international model. In 2016, a similar 
project is planned in Langa, a former township outside Cape Town in South 
Africa.234 The programme “Great Corner” specifically cites “Lugna Gatan’s“ 
concept as its biggest inspiration. They state on their website: “The long-
term aim with Great Corner is to follow the path of Lugna Gatan. We will 
engage in social entrepreneurship to create employment and, in turn, 
increase community integration and reduce crime and unemployment.”235 
Success or Failure Factors 
To be successful, the programme focused on winning over the role models of 
at-risk teenagers: their older brothers, neighbours and friends. One of the 
Fryshuset employees emphasized: “Youth themselves just have to be 
allowed dealing with their own lives and communities they live in. They 
know the problems and also how to solve them.” 236 As mentioned before, 
the young adults involved in the project had a close connection to their 
neighbourhoods and understood the local circumstances.237 They were well 
equipped to gain the trust of disadvantaged children and teenagers. One 
“steward” explained: “We approach young people in their own 
environments, and get to know them. We gain their trust by returning over 
and over to the same group, so they know we're there to help, not to make 
problems for them”.238 Teenagers and young adults were not simply the 
target group of the “Lugna Gatan” project; they were its most integral part. 
By bringing them together with politicians and other decision makers and by 
providing them with the necessary resources, Fryshuset enabled these youth 
groups to tackle their own problems. 
Another important success factor was Fryshuset’s ability of storytelling. 
Again and again, the stories of successful participants were told to decision 
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makers, politicians and the public media 239 One example was the story of a 
former ”steward” who began running his own business, with a yearly 
turnover of 250 million Swedish crowns (€ 26 million).240 Not only did this 
positive reaffirmation increase the respect and influence of the programme, 
it also boosted the self-confidence of the participating young adults and 
teenagers.  
Lessons Learned  
 Everyone can bring something to the table. The project shows that 
the target group of an initiative can also be a programme’s biggest 
asset. 
 Expertise pays off. Fryshuset is well known for its longstanding work 
experience with teenagers and children. They were approached by 
local authorities because of their insight knowledge. 
 Story telling is essential. The programme expanded because the 
stories of the involved individuals inspired people. 
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Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, GRB 
Campaign for Freedom of Information 
Description of Specific Programme 
The Campaign for Freedom of Information (CFI) was founded in 1984 and 
consistently funded by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust (JRCT) since 
1989. Before the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was introduced in 2005, 
the British public sector was not legally obliged to make any information or 
documents accessible to citizens, businesses or the media.241 Not only did the 
Campaign succeed in influencing the British government to introduce the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), it also played an important role in 
improving the initially weak bill. Even after the FOIA was introduced, the CFI 
continued to campaign for more extensive and far-reaching information 
rights. To this day, it gives advice to the public as well as public authorities on 
how to use the FOIA.242 
Origins and Rationale 
The JRCT’s financial support for the CFI was inspired by a couple significant 
events that occurred in the two years prior to 1989. First, the sale of the 
Chocolate manufacturer Rowntree Company to Nestle freed up large 
amounts of resources for the Trust, which had heavily invested in the 
company. Secondly, Trustee Grigor McClelland called on JRCT to protect, 
bolster and renew democratic processes in the UK following Margaret 
Thatcher’s election to a third term in 1987. It was feared that her re-election 
would lead to an erosion of consensus politics243, an emasculation of local 
government, a politicization of the senior civil service, and the suppression 
and distortion of official information. Moreover, it was thought that the 
growth of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (quangos) 
would result in patronage through “elective dictatorship.”244 The year 
following Thatcher’s election, JRCT commissioned a mapping study to 
determine what was already being done in that area and identifying 
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potential partners.245 The goal was to combine short term, achievable aims 
on a small scale and long term activity to change the climate of opinions on 
migration’s impact on the British society. 
In 1989, JRCT created a new grant-making programme titled, “The 
Democratic process and the Abuse of Power.” The aim of this programme 
was to ensure the continuation of the UK’s consensual style of politics in the 
absence of a written constitution in order to uphold the rights of the citizens, 
and strengthen the democratic process.246 One of the first grant recipients of 
the Democracy Programme was the campaign for Freedom of Information 
(CFI). It was based in London and created in 1984 by a coalition of 25 diverse 
national organizations to fight against unnecessary official secrecy and for 
an effective Freedom of Information Act.247 
Design and Implementation 
The campaign for Freedom of Information (CFI) is a non-profit organization 
which is not affiliated with any political party. Only two staff members 
worked on this campaign: Maurice Frankel, the director, (since 1984) and 
Katherine Gundersen (since 1999).248 
In 1989, the CFI received its first £29,000 grant from the JRCT. In the first 
year, the goal was to hire experienced researchers to focus on the topic of 
information rights, for example to explore if the United States’ FOIA was 
applicable to the British context. After this one-year grant, the JRCT 
proceeded to fund the Campaign with multiple larger grants over longer 
periods of time.249 Overall, the JRCT provided the CFI with more than 50 
percent of its income.250 
The CFI supported the introduction of a FOI in multiple different ways: 
Maurice Frankel lobbied government representatives and MPs, tried to 
convince civil servants, and networked with other non-profit organizations. 
The CFI also produced high-quality research on the subject, prepared 
briefings and bill drafts. In addition, it used its expertise to answer questions 
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by the public and to increase the visibility of the issue.251 After the 
implementation of the FOIA, the Campaign continued to improve and 
defend the act, in particular by monitoring compliance with the law.252 
Outcome and Impact 
In 1991, the first draft of the Freedom of Information Bill was unsuccessfully 
introduced by the Liberal MP Archie Kirkwood. After this setback, the next, 
incremental step forward was the introduction of a voluntary code of 
practice for the public access of information. However, this was a very 
limited approach and the Campaign continued to press for a strong FOIA. 
Their work seemed finally to come to fruition in the mid-1990s when Tony 
Blair spoke in favour of new legislation ahead of the 1997 election.253 And 
indeed, after the election the Cabinet Office, headed by David Clark, 
published a White Paper “Your Right to Know – The Government’s proposals 
for a Freedom of Information Act”. This paper introduced far-reaching 
legislation to end the “culture of secrecy” and facilitate a more open and 
transparent democracy.254 
However, Clark lost his office and the responsibility for the FOIA was 
transferred to the Home Office under Jack Straw. To the surprise of many, 
including the CSI, the Home Office published a much weaker bill in 1999. The 
CSI concluded that this was an “astonishing retreat from the Government’s 
White Paper, published only 17 months ago”. 255 The new proposal was 
criticized in both houses and the CFI successfully proposed multiple 
amendments to the bill.256 Despite these efforts, a much watered-down FOIA 
gained Royal Assent in 2000. It included 21 exemption clauses, compared to 
just seven exemptions mentioned in the White Paper.257 Furthermore, the 
implementation of the act was delayed by more than four years (January 
2005). Some critics argued that this gave several public agencies the 
opportunity to destroy documents before the first requests for information 
could be made.258 Maurice Frankel concluded: “[The Bill] achieves the 
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remarkable feat of making the code, introduced by a government opposed in 
principle to freedom of information, appear a more positive measure than 
legislation drawn up by a Government committed to the issue for 25 
years.”259 
Yet, many observers concluded that the bill would not have been passed at 
all without the continuous efforts of the Campaign. In 1999, Jack Straw 
praised Maurice Frankel and stated that the FOIA was “the product of a 
brilliant campaign by the Campaign for Freedom of Information.”260 The CFI 
added that without the moral and financial support of the JRCT the 
campaign would have been much less influential. At the same time, it is also 
difficult to claim that there would be no information legislation without the 
JRCT. Today, it is EU legislation and every EU member is obliged to provide 
citizens with access to information.261 
Success or Failure Factors 
The CFI is a forceful example of one of JRCT’s success strategies. The 
foundation fosters close and long-term relationships with its grant 
recipients. On average, up to two-thirds of grantees receive follow-on or 
repeat grants. The foundation sees itself as a “critical friend” that 
accompanies and supports project partners over long periods of time. The CFI 
demonstrates that this support can last many decades and even continue 
when the initial goals seem to slip from the grantees’ grasp. Long-term 
commitment and accountability also entail deep knowledge and trust 
between the project partners. Trust and understanding are also important 
elements in JRCT’s organizational philosophy. The foundation was built on 
Quaker values. To this day, the trustees and senior staff of the JRCT are 
Quakers. The religion and common values offer the foundation members a 
sense of purpose and serve as a base for trust and mutual understanding. 
This close relationship is extended to its grantees. 
But the programme was also heavily criticized for the close relationship 
between the foundation and the CFI. By law, charities are prohibited from 
engaging in political campaigns or from funding political parties. On the 
other hand, they are allowed to finance research which serves as an 
information base for political decisions. Already in the late 1980s, Robin 
Guthrie, Head of the Charity Commission, criticized charities for being 
highly-involved in left-wing campaigns (I‘m not sure it was Guthrie so maybe 
just say the Charity Commission?). There were suggestions that JRCT was 
“testing the limits” of the existing charity laws. The JRCT was well aware of 
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this balancing act. At the same time they considered the CFI as “probably the 
most effective lobby organization with which we have been associated, 
achieving a series of pieces of legislation even during the inauspicious Tory 
years.”  
It was not only the strategy of the foundation and Campaign that were 
criticized; the FOIA itself continues to be heavily contested. Time and again, 
the government tried to curtail the rights of citizens by restricting freedom 
of information: bills were proposed to make it easier to refuse requests, to 
exclude Parliamentary expenses or to remove all cabinet documents from 
the FOIA. Each time the CFI successfully supported the rejection of these bills. 
The experience and deep knowledge of the Campaign were critical in 
opposing political critics. The FOIA remains controversial legislation. Tony 
Blair stated: “It's not practical for government. If you are trying to take a 
difficult decision and you're weighing up the pros and cons, you have frank 
conversations. Everybody knows this in their walk of life. Whether you are in 
business – or running a newspaper – there are conversations you want to 
have preliminary to taking a decision that are frank.”262 
Lessons Learned  
 The political climate is essential to the influence of campaigns. 
Labour was going through a political crisis in the early 1990s which 
increased its openness to new ideas from the outside. Once Labour 
was in power it was less dependent on external support. 
 Financial support of political campaigns is a balancing act. 
Foundations have to ensure that they conform to the existing 
charity laws to protect themselves and their other grantees. 
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King Baudouin Foundation, BEL 
The Training of Imams  
Description of Specific Programme 
The Training of Imams was a programme launched by the King Baudouin 
Foundation in 2003. It was part of a wider collection of initiatives underway 
in the state to improve social cohesion among the various ethnic and 
religious groups living in Belgium. Under this broad heading, the Board 
decided to focus on areas where they believed the foundation would have 
the greatest impact. Among these were schools and health, establishing a 
dialogue between Muslim and non-Muslim communities and addressing the 
important leadership role of Imams in the Muslim communities. Given that 
Imams often place an important leadership role within communities, KBF 
believed that a focus on this subgroup would have the potential of 
promoting positive change within and between the various ethnic and 
religious subgroups residing in Belgium. 
Before embarking on this initiative, there were important points to consider: 
first, unlike many other religions, Islam has no defined hierarchical structure; 
second, Imams often play an important leadership role beyond the confines 
of a Mosque; finally, the role of Imams varies depending on the religious 
school of thought. KBF was aware of these differences, yet there was little 
public knowledge of how Imams were trained and how this differed from 
other major religious. For this reason, the first phase of the programme 
consisted of gathering vital information through an external steering 
committee.  
Origins and Rationale 
KBF’s programme was not only a response to a lack of understanding of 
Islamic religions, but also a means to address blatant examples of 
discrimination and growing concerns for radicalization. When the 
programme began in 2003, there were an estimated 350,000 Muslims living 
in Belgium, primarily of Moroccan and Turkish descent.263 This was about 4% 
of the population (today there are an estimated 6%). Given its minority 
status, there was a lack of knowledge about the practice of Islam and the 
training of Imams. 
While Catholics and Protestants had specific institutions and guidelines for 
the training of their clergy (e.g. seminary schools, faculties of theology) there 
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was no clear training scheme for Imams. Imams were often brought in from 
abroad, and many feared that Imams were contributing to the radicalization 
of Muslims. This led to the question of where and how Imams received their 
training and to what extent this included knowledge of the local culture and 
national laws. Fear of radicalization, on the part of the media and others, 
was an important thread in the thinking behind the programme.  
A lack of mutual understanding between Muslim and non-Muslim 
communities had been evident in the media, which often spoke of the 
supposed danger of Imams.264 After the attacks of 9/11, the political climate 
was already unfavourable to Muslims and rife with prejudices. Although 
Islam had been a recognized religion in Belgium since 1971, the local mosques 
and Imams were still not benefiting from public funds that were accessible 
to other religious groups. Freedom of religion in Belgium is coupled with 
financial support from the state for recognized religions (Roman Catholicism, 
Protestantism, Anglicanism, Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and non-
confessional humanism) and the government paid the salaries and pensions 
of the clergy from these religions (Article 181 of the constitution). State 
recognition brought additional privileges, such as free broadcasting time, 
subsidized housing and materials, and religious education in public 
schools.265 Muslims were not only excluded from many of these but were 
also experiencing a higher degree of discrimination. Although the Centre 
Interfédéral pour l'égalité des Chances (CECLR) had been charged with 
investigating discrimination based on race, little had actually been done. In 
2002, CECLR received 1,316 complaints, of which only 17 were brought to 
court.266 
Several factors contributed to a path dependence of the status quo. 
Attempts by the government to arrive at a solution were stymied by the 
divisions between Flanders and Wallonia and compounded by a fragmented 
Muslim community. For a long time, Belgium was slow to implement 
reforms due to a lack of political incentives and the lack of a representative 
Muslim body.267 The enforcement of anti-discrimination laws is particularly 
challenging in Belgium, in which the jurisdiction between the region, local 
and national levels is not clearly delineated.268 A state reform in 2002 that 
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decentralized the recognition of religious communities gave this jurisdiction 
to the regions - Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia. Each had its own approach 
to implementing recognition of Islam, and the Federal Government generally 
avoided this issue by localizing decisions.269 This contributed to a fragmented 
and slow process. For instance, the first school inspectors of Islamic religious 
education were only appointed in 2005, the Belgian government did not fund 
Imams until 2007, and Islamic television and radio programming did not 
begin until 2011.270 
Belgium’s federal system was one barrier to progress, but another was the 
Muslim community’s difficulties in forming a united representative body. To 
benefit from public funds, religions are required to have an official 
representative council, but forming such a body was difficult for a religion 
with no hierarchical structure and a very diverse group of followers.271 The 
Islamic Cultural Centre (ICC) became the de facto interlocutor of the 
government, but it was not considered to be representative of the local 
Muslim community as it was run by the Gulf Arab States.272 The 
government’s expectation that different Islamic sects would unite under one 
representative body only highlighted the lack of understanding about the 
religion and its followers in Belgium.  
Thus, the King Baudouin Foundation set out to find answers to questions 
about the role of imams, the knowledge and skills they needed, and how 
their training could be supported at the local level. In order to provide cross-
national and inter-religious comparisons, the foundation gathered data on 
the training of leaders in other religious congregations in Belgium and in 
other European states. KBF knew that it had the reputational capital to play 
an important role in this issue, as well as the network to unite stakeholders 
from within Flanders and Wallonia. Unlike government, it also had the ability 
to act as a neutral platform for deliberation on this highly political and 
sensitive subject— a risk many politicians were not willing to take. 
Design and Implementation 
The first priority was to involve all the stakeholders and to go on a fact-
finding mission. As a first step, KBF created an advisory committee that 
included leaders from business, academia, religious groups, and the public 
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and non-profit sectors. It was essential to include the view of leaders from 
Muslim communities as well, who were selected by the Programme Officer 
(PO) at the time. This allowed the foundation to gather detailed information 
without imposing its own perceptions and priorities, acting as a neutral 
convener that informs policy decisions.  
One of the most difficult tasks in this process was determining which 
religious leaders to involve and who to partner with from the Muslim 
community. Given the differences and divisions between many followers of 
the Islamic faith, it would be important to find leaders that were open to 
cooperation. The PO was not fully aware of all the various groups, but his 
‘naiveté’ was beneficial in the sense that it brought opposing voices and 
unexpected groupings to the table. In the end, the foundation used a process 
of ‘trial and error’ that allowed for enough flexibility to make adjustments. 
The PO came up with a final list for the steering committee, which was 
chaired by a well-respected, retired senior diplomat. Their responsibility was 
to identify and prioritize issues around Muslim inclusion within Belgian 
society, and most importantly to advise KBF on the role it could play. 
The committee issued a report with recommendations, which received 
considerable coverage from the press. It underscored the lack of information 
about Islam: How many mosques are there in Belgium, and where are they 
located? What are the dominant schools of thought, and where do their 
Imams come from? How are Imams trained, and to they receive any training 
at all? The topics of religious leadership in Islam had already been highly 
contested in Belgium, prompting an immediate response by the government 
that it would not be involved in finding these answers. However, KBF gladly 
took on the responsibility.  
Following the committee’s recommendation, KBF commissioned a report 
from two sociologists from the ULB and the University of Ghent to carry out 
a study. The research had the objective to take stock of the current situation 
in the three regions of the country, to determine priority issues to be 
resolved and to highlight existing initiatives, including those in neighbouring 
countries. The report, “Mosquees, imams et professeurs de religion 
islamique” (Mosques, Imams and Professors of the Islamic Religion) was 
published in 2004 and was the first survey of its kind in Belgium.273 The 
publication made note of the important difference within Islam and the 
different roles of Mosques, writing that knowledge about this is critical to 
the understanding of how local Muslim communities function.274  
The report spared the interest of many, including the European Union. 
Following a roundtable organized by the European Parliament, the 
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Foundation published a further report titled “The case for training imams in 
Belgium: Reference points in Belgium and Europe.”275 An additional question 
that arose was what type of training imams would need and how this 
compared to the training of other religious clergy. It was clear that more 
information needed to be gathered if the report was to inform public 
policies. To answer this question, KBF commissioned a report from Jean-
Francois Husson, a highly respected academic who had in depth knowledge 
of the relationship between organized religion and state. His report, “The 
Training of Imams in Europe: The Current State,” was published in 2007 and 
summarized how leaders of other religions and recognized cults are trained 
in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, England, Germany, and Sweden. The 
King Baudouin Foundation was the primary funder of this project; at a later 
stage the Belgian government co-funded parts of the report.  
Outcome and Impact 
Various initiatives were born from the roundtable discussions that KBF 
hosted, as well as the subsequent research reports. For instance, the 
representative from the office of the Minister for Schools and Higher 
Education for the French-speaking community persuaded the Minister to co-
finance an additional small project that focused on identifying existing 
Muslim education centres and programmes. Following on from this, the 
University of Louvain received a small grant to host a training session for 
Islamic leaders. However, this became a point of contention with one of the 
Muslim bodies which was running its own programme and for which it was 
seeking recognition and financial support. Moreover, the Minister of the 
Flemish speaking community supported a different approach, in which the 
first step was for the Muslim community to define its own training needs 
and requirements.276  
In spite of these initial disagreements, the issues gained traction in the 
following years. In 2005, the Belgian Minister of Justice relied on research 
funded by KBF for an initiative to harmonize the existing divisions of funding 
quotas, which prompted the Muslim Community to come forward with its 
own proposals. The following year, KBF gave a presentation to the European 
Parliament and organized a seminar for EU decision-makers together with 
the European Policy Centre277. The European Commission and Parliament 
took a particular interest in this issue, also on a European scale. This inspired 
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KBF to commission the report that was published in 2007 on the training of 
Imams in Europe.278  
The report concluded that all religions had a proportion of foreign ministers 
or leaders, meaning that Islam was not unusual in this regard. It also 
identified two key elements for the training of religious leaders: theological 
knowledge on the one hand, and knowledge of the language, culture and 
society on the other. Another important finding in the report was that 
whereas other religions clearly define the roles and process of becoming 
ministers or leaders, Islam has no formal rules, making it more difficult to 
define authority and knowledge. The report ended with possible options for 
ways in which Imam training might be organized in Belgium, all of which 
included the necessity to recruit the support of local Muslim leaders.279  
By 2007 the programme had achieved results at various levels. Information 
was available for the training of imams in Belgium and other countries. The 
communication between key stakeholders from the Muslim community, 
education and government improved, the issue gained political salience. 
Internationally, there was also a stronger interest in developing training 
programmes for Imams that were recognized internationally.280 By the end 
of 2007, the Walloon and Flemish governments had recognized the first 
mosques in which 1-2 imams were paid. That same year, Belgium passed an 
Anti-Discrimination Act outlawing discrimination based on religion.  
Success or Failure Factors 
The research that KBF endorsed on Muslims and Islam in Belgium and other 
European member states helped draw attention to the issue of Imam 
training and ultimately contributed to more equal opportunities for 
Muslims; both Flemish and Walloon governments began to subsidize Imams 
in 2007. The foundation successfully convened the key stakeholders from a 
variety of sectors to come up with important conclusions about the training 
of Imams. This led to the involvement of the government and also 
highlighted the issue at the level of the European Union. In the end, an 
initiative that began with the modest goal of research and dissemination 
catalysed a more pragmatic discourse on Islam that emphasized inclusion 
and cooperation.281  
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However, this was only the tip of the iceberg, and much work remains to be 
done to counter discrimination. Muslims continue to be the most contested 
religious minority in Belgium.282 Even after passing the Anti-Discrimination 
Act, Belgium has since passed laws that limit the freedom of religious 
expression, such as the banning of the niqab in 2011 (the only other EU 
country with this ban is France). Officials have tried to make financial 
assistance to mosques contingent on certain conditions, such as the 
surveillance of Imams. 
This issue continues to be extremely pertinent, especially in light of 
Belgium’s recent reputation for harbouring a high number of Muslims that 
are susceptible to radicalization. In a digital age, one is left to question the 
extent to which a programme that focuses on Imams alone can effectively 
counter radicalization. The public policy issue at hand may rather be the 
broader picture of Muslim integration is Western Europe. Compared to other 
groups, Muslim communities in Europe are often more marginalized, both 
socially and economically, and more homogenous and isolated by country of 
origin, thus hampering integration. While the King Baudouin Foundation laid 
the groundwork for more Imams to be trained in Europe, the work of 
building bridges between disconnected communities is far finished. 
Lessons Learned 
 Foundations play a critical role as neutral conveners and knowledge 
entrepreneur around a controversial and sensitive issue. In this case, 
KBF was also an important bridging institution between its two 
divided regions, Flanders and Wallonia. 
 Change is often slow, requires a favourable external environment, 
and often depends on the actions of others over whom the 
foundation has no control. The heightened level of media coverage 
on Muslims provided an opportunity for KBF to step and as a neutral 
voice. 
 The lack of knowledge, or ‘the power of naiveté,’ -being willing to 
step into a complicated and politically sensitive situation can be a 
powerful role for foundations. 
 ‘Smart’ recommendations - KBF made sure that its 
recommendations were carefully formulated to be actionable. 
 Bringing in the government as a partner was important for the 
research and convening to inform decision makers on the policy 
level. 
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Körber Foundation, DEU 
History Competition of the Federal President 
Description of Specific Programme 
In 1973, the former Federal President Gustav Heinemann and the 
entrepreneur Kurt A. Körber initiated the first German history competition, 
the “Geschichtswettbewerb des Bundespräsidenten” (History Competition of 
the Federal President). It is considered the “largest organized amateur 
research movement” in Germany. Over the last 40 years, more than 136,000 
young Germans participated and submitted around 30,000 papers, 
presentations and exhibits.283 The research topic is announced in September 
and the submission deadline is at the end of February the following year. All 
children and teenagers who are under the age of 21 and living in Germany 
can participate in the competition.284 A network of over 200 institutions and 
organizations, including schools, museums and archives, supports the young 
historians during their work.285  
Origins and Rationale 
The “History Competition of the Federal President” can be understood as a 
countermovement to the post-1968 area. While reform-minded politicians 
and the public consciously focused on the future, the competition 
highlighted historical issues and asked questions about the past. Germany 
was struggling with historical disillusionment, and the competition was a 
way to emphasize the values of traditions and of knowing your own 
history.286 Kurt Körber and his foundation considered the competition also a 
way of giving back to the society. Kurt Körber explained: “Those who are 
using the freedom and creative forces of the social market economy are also 
obligated to ensure its preservation and advancement, and should return 
their fortune on a voluntary basis to the society.“287 
Overall, the goal of the competition was to spark the interest of young 
people in their own history. Equally important, the foundation hoped that 
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the research projects would promote independent thinking and strengthen 
the students’ sense of responsibility.288 Dr. Thomas Paulsen, member of the 
executive board of Körber Foundation, stresses this point: “The gleam in the 
eyes of the participants shows their enthusiasm for the historical topic they 
chose. It is very impressive to see that young people take a stand in their 
works with regard to current issues”.289 
Design and Implementation 
The Office of the Federal President (Bundespräsidialamt) and the Körber 
Foundation organize and host the competition together. All young people, 
including high school students, university students and apprentices, who are 
21 or younger, can participate. There is no advance application or registration 
necessary. All contributions uploaded by the end of February will be 
considered.290 The guidelines and other important information are available 
online and in the magazine spurensuchen (“searching for traces”).. The 
magazine is published by the foundation and introduces last year’s winners, 
evaluates the competition qualitatively and quantitatively, and includes 
articles on broader historical subjects.291 
The topic - or research question - changes from year to year. It is chosen by 
the advisory board of the history competition, which is headed by the State 
Secretary of the Office of the Federal President. The director of the Körber 
foundation is co-chairman. The board members include presidents and CEOs 
of other foundations focusing on history and education, authors and 
journalists, and political representatives. The topics are not considered 
“political statements” or as an “intervention”. For the most part, the research 
questions are not influenced by current discussions in the media but instead 
revolve around medium or long term issues.292 Past topics were, for example, 
“Everyday life in Nazi Germany”, “Environment has History”, “Heroes: adored, 
misjudged, forgotten” 293 
The young contestants can tackle these issues in multiple different formats. 
Their submissions can be written contributions, multimedia presentations, 
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movies or audio productions, or three-dimensional projects, for example 
exhibitions or games. In addition to these contributions the participants 
hand in work reports demonstrating and explaining their research 
methods.294 Overall, 550 monetary prices are awarded on a national and 
state level.295 A state jury chooses and honours the best reports of each state 
– 250 first-prize winners (€250 each). Additionally, 250 advancement awards 
(€100) and a prize for the best school in each state are given. The 250 state 
champions compete for 50 national awards: the jury chooses 5 first prize 
winners (€2,000 each), 15 second-prize winners (€1,000) and 30 third-prize 
winners (€500).296 The first-prize winners are honoured by the President at 
Bellevue Palace. Laureates aged 16 and older also qualify to apply for the 
national and European Academy of the Körber Foundation.297 
Outcome and Impact 
Every two years the competition highlights a new topic. Often, issues which 
have not been discussed extensively by the public are brought to the 
forefront. Even if a better-known research subject is chosen, the discussion is 
enriched by the perspectives of young people. Still, in many cases the 
competition focuses on history of everyday life and local history and thereby 
shining a light on questions which have been neglected by the academic 
discipline. In the 1980s, for instance, students from across the nation 
researched the topic of forced labour in Germany. The topic was not covered 
by the media until the late 1990’s in the context of compensatory payments 
by German industry. Throughout the competition’s history, students have 
pioneered new research methods, for example oral history and inter-
generational conversations.298 In many cases these new methods brought 
fresh insights and broke new ground for formerly neglected research 
approaches. In the same way, students also explored forgotten material in 
archives.299 In many cases they were the first ones to access and use certain 
documents. 
The competition has a particularly strong significance on the local level. For 
the most part, students choose projects with a connection to the city or 
region they live in. The research projects can help strengthen the link 
between people and places. This is an important side effect of the history 
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competition, especially because many people feel disconnected from their 
birth place and suffer from the anonymity of their daily lives. But the project 
does not only influence the individual researcher. In many cases the projects 
spark local discussions and discourse. Local media highlight the research 
results. In this way small-scale student projects can encourage people to 
grapple with their own history and identity.300 
Due to its success, the “History Competition of the Federal President” also 
served as an international model. Over 15 years ago, the Russian human 
rights organization MEMORIAL initiated a similar school competition 
following the German model.301 
Success or Failure Factors 
Overall, the competition is widely known and many young people participate 
each year. The focus on fascinating research questions is one of the success 
factors. Topics such as “Used-loved-killed: animals in our history“ (Genutzt-
geliebt-getötet: Tiere in unserer Geschichte)302 spark the interest of young 
people. The strong network of schools, cultural and historical institutions, 
museums and archives also contribute to the competition’s success. 
Dedicated teachers support the students during their research projects and 
the history competition is an integral part of the curriculum in many schools. 
Archives and museums grant students access to historical documents and 
help them understand their significance. Furthermore, the involvement and 
patronage of the Federal President increase the visibility and appeal of the 
competition. Together with the prize money, a visit to the Bellevue Palace 
serves as an attractive motivation to participate. 
Despite its visible success, the history competition is also criticized. To name 
a major point of contention: The Körber AG specializes in machines for the 
production of filter-tipped cigarettes and the Foundation’s endowment is 
directly linked to the tobacco industry. Some argue, therefore, that the close 
cooperation between the Office of the Federal President and the Körber 
Foundation violates the guidelines of the World Health Organization (WHO). 
Its guidelines state that political leaders “should not accept, support or 
endorse the tobacco industry organizing, promoting, participating in, or 
performing, youth, public education.”303 Nick Schneider, a physician and 
expert on WHO guidelines agrees: “You cannot simultaneously represent the 
interests of health politics and on the other hand work for a foundation or 
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company that produces a product, which is evidentially co-responsible for 
sickness and death.” 304 Politicians object to this criticism and emphasize the 
good reputation of the foundation and the societal impact of the sponsored 
projects in education and research.305 Whether a history competition can be 
considered to be promoting tobacco use, is indeed questionable. Yet, a 
contradiction between the revenue source of a foundation and its goals 
cannot be disregarded. 
Lessons Learned  
 Cooperation with political leaders can heighten visibility and, 
with the right incentives, increase the motivation of 
participants. 
 Fresh and interesting topics can keep a long-running project 
relevant. 
 Competitions can serve as tools to motivate young people. 
 Unlike grant-making for new activities where money is 
committed before results, prizes spend money after the event. 
Prizes are no longer very fashionable in the foundation world 
but, arguably, have some important advantages - they tend to 
be low risk (because you pay on the basis of outputs) and high 
profile. In terms of the immediate output the foundation cannot 
lose. 
 Foundations need to consider the congruence between the 
sources of their income and the groups with whom they work. 
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Mozaik Foundation, BIH 
EkoMozaik 
Description of Specific Programme 
EkoMozaik Ltd. is one of two social enterprises founded by the Mozaik 
Foundation. It is the first and largest social business in Bosnia that was 
created in 2009 to provide an employment opportunity to the people of the 
economically depressed Municipality of Sekovici in the Eastern Repubika 
Srpska, but also as a source of income for the foundation.306  
Thanks to a contract between Mozaik and the Municipality of Sekovici, 
Mozaik was able to cultivate the land of a former military complex free of 
charge for the duration of 20 years. Within a couple years, it was the fastest-
growing organic honey producer in BH. In addition to producing honey, 
EkoMozaik grows organic foods, ornamental flowers, and rents out 
agricultural equipment. The profits are reinvested into the foundation and 
the community. The financial objective of the social enterprise is to operate 
independently without external financial support or human capital, but this 
has proven to be difficult.307  
Origins and Rationale 
EkoMozaik was founded for three principle reasons: first, to generate jobs, 
second, to maintain long-term sustainability, and third, to provide 
opportunities for divided ethnic groups to cooperate. 
Given the urgent need for increased economic activity, job creation was a 
priority. When the for-profit was founded in 2009, Sekovici had the highest 
unemployment rate of Srpska. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s social and economic 
situation continues to be characterized by high unemployment, poverty, 
social exclusion, and stagnant GDP growth.308 A World Bank survey (2010) 
sheds light on the dire economic situation in BiH: 60% of the population at 
risk of poverty of social exclusion compared to average for the region. The 
unemployment rate for the total labour force in 2009 was about 24%; the 
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rate for women was about 27%. The rate increased with time, rising to 28% 
total and about 30% for women in 2013.309  
Moreover, BH’s financing model is one of the major barriers to the 
government’s ability to reduce poverty. In 2010, the government spent about 
7% of its GDP on financial assistance, compared to 1.6 % GDP average for the 
region.310 13% of GDP came from public sector salaries, the highest rate in 
Europe.311  
An additional factor was Mozaik’s need for long-term sustainability. The 
Mozaik Community Development Foundation needed to generate income in 
order to sustain its activities in case international funders were to pull out of 
the Western Balkans.312 
Finally, a social business was thought to be productive way if contributing to 
ethnic reconciliation. Ethnic tensions still remain between Bosniaks, Serbs 
and Croats in the former Yugoslavia.313 EkoMozaik builds bridges between 
these different groups by purposefully hired people from the three different 
ethnic groups. 
It is against this backdrop that the Mozaik Foundation decided to step into 
the picture. 
Design and Implementation 
The method used by Mozaik is social entrepreneurship, which “strives to 
involve residents in analysing their community needs, identifying solutions 
based on available resources, developing a plan of action and implementing 
the plan.”314 Social businesses are an important part the social economy in 
South-eastern Europe and are often supported by international development 
agencies and foundations. 
Start-up capital for EkoMozaik was provided by the Ministry of Agriculture of 
the Czech Republic and Sekovici (public-private partnership). Mozaik initially 
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provided 75 % of the funding, leaving the rest to government, businesses and 
private individuals. Today, this ration is reversed.315 
Before creating its social enterprises, Mozaik’s was completely dependent on 
foreign direct investment. The economic downturn in 2008 had also limited 
the availability of external funds. 
In order to become more independent and sustainable, the foundation 
sought ways to balance its expenses. Mozaik consulted with various experts 
before it decided to take a leap into profitable social enterprises. 
Among those consulted were the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of 
the World Bank and members of the board. As part of a project on Corporate 
Governance, IFC had assisted EkoMozaik in attracting new investors, 
expanding its production, and creating additional jobs via the construction 
of a greenhouse for lavender and vegetables.316 The first phase of the project 
(2005-2008) focused on introducing corporate governance concepts to the 
market, and the second phase (2009-2011) worked together with specific 
companies and public sector institutions to improve performance.317  
Outcome and Impact 
During 2012, Mozaik supported 326 actions, of which 48% were collected 
from local resources: state institutions, entrepreneurs, municipal authorities 
and individuals. Work in the communities involved over 5.700 volunteers and 
105.199 volunteer hours. These results confirm that Mozaik is a leader in 
mobilizing local resources. 
o Provides employment and living wages to 181 residents318 
o Encouraged gender equality by empowering women to become 
more economically independent. 
o In 2010, the Schwab Foundation named Mozaik’s director social 
entrepreneur of the year in Central and Eastern Europe by. That 
same year, USAID in Washington awarded two grants to Mozaik at 
global calls, which was important for the future development of 
Mozaik.319 
o The social enterprise was able to take on a role in crisis management 
as well. After floods devastated much of the country in 2014, 
EkoMozaik distributed half of its vegetable seedlings to farmers who 
 
315 Ibid. 
316http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/region__ext_content/regions/europe+mid
dle+east+and+north+africa/ifc+in+europe+and+central+asia/news/feature+story+ec
a+-+improving+corporate+governance+in+southern+europe 
317 Ibid. 
318 http://www.mozaik.ba/en/drustveni-biznisi/eko-mozaik 
319http://www.mozaik.ba/media/k2/attachments/izvjestaji/Annual_Report_2010.pdf 
86 
had suffered major losses.320 It also installed LifeSaver plants for 
water purification in Sekovici and helps reconstruct devastated 
roads and buildings.321  
Success or Failure Factors 
Starting a business in the economic and socio-political context of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was challenging.  
Civil society still largely depends on foreign donors, and local communities 
are very much dependent on the state. Foreign Direct Investment fills some 
of this need, but does not reach all parts of the country or make up for 
lacking local initiatives.322 Moreover, the structure of government is complex 
and overlapping, which has led to delays in aid distribution. For instance, in 
2013 the ethnic divisions within the country, composed of the Serb Republic 
and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, have prevented agreement 
on how to manage and distribute EU pre-accession funds (IPA). Although the 
EU has required a streamlined distribution mechanism, both regions have 
insisted on managing the funds independently of each other.323 EkoMozaik 
works to mitigate these political challenges by working together with the 
political factions. Thanks to Mozaik, the two local political parties’ 
cooperated together for the first time.324 A joint and vested interest in the 
social enterprise motivated both sides to work together in the maintenance 
of the track that grants access to field.  
Using the land on the former barracks has proven to be challenging as well. 
The site is high up in the mountains and hard to reach, making it difficult for 
basic equipment to reach the business. The remote location also made it 
challenging to find nearby staff and makes transportation costs especially 
high.325 While Mozaik was able to leverage the land made available to them, 
the agricultural sector is not a steady or reliable source of income. For 
instance, as with most agricultural sectors, EkoMozaik suffered great losses 
during the floods in 2012.326 Its Greenhouse was also completely destroyed by 
strong winds in March 2015, shortly before EkoMozaik was ready to produce 
1.12 million vegetable seedlings.327 In order to ensure the continuation of 
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production, the foundation needed to rent a greenhouse to plant 850,000 
new vegetable seedlings. Other issues relate to personnel and trends 
towards local markets and home grown foods.328 Low market demand has 
led EkoMozaik to exports its total production of berries to the international 
market.329 
Although it is the financial object of the Mozaik’s social enterprises to be 
self-sustainable, their factors have contributed to EkoMozaik falling short of 
this objective. Even so, the foundation continues to learn and adapt its 
methods to find the most effective approach.  
Lessons Learned 
 Think carefully be accepting a gift. Although Mozaik was granted 
land to develop a social enterprise based on horticulture and 
apiculture, it has not been very profitable. It has, however, had the 
social value of bringing together politically opposed groups. 
 Even the best of projects can falter due to uncontrollable 
circumstances. Some of the adversity Mozaik faced was due to 
corruption and the difficulty of doing business in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It has also been difficult to find qualified professionals 
in such a remote area.  
 Building up a reputation takes time and a market for your products 
takes time 
 Flexibility is key, especially in the early phases of an enterprise and 
when working with unpredictable circumstances. After the 
devastating floods, Moziak switched gears by helping local farmers 
rebuild their livelihoods. 
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Open Society Foundations, USA 
Central European University 
Description of Specific Programme 
The Central European University (CEU) is one of the most international 
universities and the leading academic institution in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE)330. It is “based on the premise that human fallibility can be 
counterbalanced by the critical discussion of ideas and that this critical spirit 
can be sustained best in societies where citizens have the freedom to 
scrutinize competing theories and openly evaluate and change government 
policies.”331 Moreover, it is guided by the pursuit of truth wherever it leads, 
respect for the diversity of cultures and peoples, and commitment to 
resolving differences through debate not denial.332 Today, the University has 
about 1,400 students from more than 100 countries and 370 faculty 
members from more than 130 countries. It offers a wide range of both 
Master’s and Doctoral level degrees. 
Origins and Rationale 
The idea for the University was conceived by George Soros along with 
intellectuals and former dissidents at an educational conference in 
Dubrovnik in 1989, which became operational in 1991.333 The overarching 
motive behind funding a liberal-minded University in the heart of Eastern 
Europe was to aid the process of transformation and democratisation of the 
formerly Soviet-influenced states. After the fall of the iron curtain, Soros 
believed that the region urgently needed to begin taking a critical and 
Western-style approach to education, which had previously been banned 
under communist influence. Prior to establishing CEU, George Soros helped 
fund curricula in established universities that previously followed 
communist ideologies. He reformed the Karl Marx University of Economics in 
Budapest, with the goal of creating liberal ‘western’ business education.334 As 
a native of Hungary, Soros cared deeply about supporting the 
democratization and reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe. Soros’ 
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ultimate vision was to “facilitate the transition from dictatorship to 
democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.”335 
Design and Implementation 
George Soros donated $25 million for the creation of CEU and made annual 
contributions that covered everything except for rent and local salaries, 
which was left to the government. This contribution was paramount to the 
rapid growth of the university, as it was able to cut through red tape 
relatively quickly compared to publicly funded schools. Soros ended his 
annual payments in 2001, and instead endowed the university with $250 
million. At the time, the only other universities to have larger endowments 
were Cambridge ($940M) and Oxford ($725M).336 The Open Society 
Foundation recruited professors and students from across the world with the 
intent of replicating the traditional Anglo-American research university. 
Although it was initially thought that CEU would simply train future western 
academics, the university evolved into a research hub of its own and 
attracted a vast number of MA and PhD students.  
Outcome and Impact 
After only 10 years, CEU made a considerable name for itself and attracted 
some of the most talented professors and students. According to the 
Chronicle of Higher Education, the university is a “regional and intellectual 
powerhouse.”337 The university anchored itself as a western institution 
within the former soviet bloc and has educated thousands of students on 
the values of liberal democracies. The university began as a hybrid university 
of three distinct traditions from the US, Europe (mostly the UK), and Central 
Europe. Eventually, it evolved into its own international “network 
tradition.”338 
Success or Failure Factors 
The CEU succeeded in becoming “a beacon of academic excellence, cultural 
tolerance, and advanced research in the service of democracy and 
policymaking.”339 Twenty-five years after its inception, the university reached 
its goals of promoting an open society and becoming a fully independent 
 
335 http://www.ceu.edu/about/history 
336 Bollag, B (2001, November 2). George Soros Will Give $250-Million to Central 
European University. Chronicle Of Higher Education, 48:10: A62. 
337 Avogino, T. (1998, October 16). Central European University Faces Dilemma as its 
Benefactor Limits his Support, Chronicle of Higher Education. 
338 Stepan, A. (2009). The Early Years of Central European University as a Network: A 
Memoir, Social Research: An International Quarterly, 76:2, pp. 687-710. 
339 Fleishman, J., Kohler, S. & Schindler, S. (2007). Casebook for The Foundation: A 
Great American Secret. New York: PublicAffairs, p. 216. 
90 
and academically reputable institution.340 Needless to say, it faced a number 
of challenges along the way. George Soros ceased his annual contributions in 
2001, and endowed the university with a $250 million gift. The University 
was growing rapidly, and developing a donor base as quickly proved difficult. 
Soros had stipulated that external support should come from matching 
funds, which created an additional challenge.341  
During this time, the university faced difficulties in clearly identifying its 
mission and direction. Soros had created two other supporting organizations 
that worked with CEU: the Higher Education Support Programme (HESP), The 
Open Society Institute (OSI). The three institutions often clashed over goals, 
missions, and territories, but all had the best interest of the university in 
mind. Initially, CEU was entirely steered by Soros alone, but later he recruited 
an international board to help steer the school in the right direction and 
create an “authoritative, knowledgeable, and autonomous” entity.342 As one 
of the most controversial philanthropists, George Soros’ has been widely 
praised but also criticized for his efforts in CEE, of which education has been 
a significant component. While many celebrate Soros’ achievements in 
Central and Eastern Europe, others accuse him of funding ‘liberal extremism’ 
and singlehandedly engaging in his own diplomacy and foreign policy, 
sometime in conflict with government policies. Soros has been accused of 
‘meddling in domestic affairs’ and even taking down governments by 
supporting colour revolutions.343 Moreover, he has been criticized in the US 
for undermining US foreign policy by creating more friction between the US 
and Russia and provoking opposition in allied countries.344 
Lessons Learned 
 Foundations should have a clear exit strategy when funding 
Educational institutions and ensure that the university is on track to 
becoming independent and self-sustainable. 
 Giving up control as donor and trusting stakeholders to steer an 
institution in the right direction important factors in fostering 
sustainable and credible institutions. 
 Philanthropy with a political agenda may run the risk of conflicting 
with, and in some cases undermining domestic government policies.  
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Pew Charitable Trusts, USA 
Global Warming and Climate Change 
Programme & Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change 
Description of Specific Programme  
The Pew Charitable Trusts’ (PCT) work on climate began with the Global 
Warming and Climate Change Programme in 1990 under the leadership of 
Joshua Reichert. Pew partnered with the Energy Foundation to make a total 
of 261 grants worth $39.8 million over the span of 8 years. The programme 
ended in 1998, when PCT founded the independent, nonpartisan, not-for-
profit Pew Center on Global Climate Change.345 Its mission was to “provide 
credible information, straight answers, and innovative solutions that address 
global climate change.” As such, it worked “to [depoliticize] global climate 
change as a domestic issue and… [work] with ‘the more constructive 
elements of the business community.”346  
In 2011, the centre separated from PCT and became an independent, non-
profit organization: the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES). It 
was funded from a broader base of charitable and corporate sponsors, 
including three strategic partners: Entergy, HP and Shell. This transition was 
overseen by Pew Center founder and president, Eileen Claussen, until 2013. 
Ms. Claussen stayed on board for three years to allow for a smooth 
transition. With this change came a new mission and strategic approach as 
well, which is described as follows:347 
o “A Reliable Source – We provide timely, impartial information and 
analysis on the scientific, economic, technological and policy 
dimensions of climate and energy challenges.  
o Working Together – We bring together business, the environmental 
community, other stakeholders, and policymakers to achieve 
common understandings and consensus solutions.  
o Concrete Action – We work with members of our Business 
Environmental Leadership Council and others to take action on the 
ground.  
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o Innovative Policy – We work closely with policymakers and 
stakeholders to promote pragmatic, effective policies at the state, 
national and international levels. “ 
Origins and Rationale 
When the programme was created in the 1990s, there was a growing body of 
evidence on the reality of climate change and a heightened awareness of its 
dangers. The initial programme was conceived as a means to find non-
partisan policy solutions based on deeper research and analysis. Part of the 
impetus for this project was the perceived failure of the Federal government 
at the time to adequately address the issue of climate change. Federal 
climate change spending was consistently low and did not begin to pick up 
until 2002, as a result of President Bush’s climate change plan.348 Federal 
spending increased again in 2009, following the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA).349  
Design and Implementation 
The Global Warming and Climate Change Programme sought to provoke 
federal legislation that would reduce the drivers of climate change. After 
many failed attempts at this, the programme shifted its focus to coastal 
states California, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, 
Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine.350 By raising awareness on global 
warming, they sought to convince state governments to invest in renewable 
energy. It did so by providing resources on carbon pollution standards and 
climate change, making frequent media appearances, collaborating with 
partners to support the use more environmentally friendly vehicles, and 
launching the award-winning “Make an Impact” programme that helped 
employees and consumers reduce their carbon footprints. 
Outcome and Impact 
The Global Warming and Climate Change Programme “was widely 
recognized in the United States and abroad as a credible, independent force 
for pragmatic climate action.”351 The Pew Center on Global Climate Change 
boasts several achievements:352 
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o Publishing close to 100 peer-reviewed reports on climate science, 
economics, policy and solutions; 
o Testifying before Congress 30 times and working to promote 
bipartisan legislation; 
o Advising the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Western 
Climate Initiative, Fortune 500 companies, and states and regions 
across the country on climate and energy issues; 
o Advancing international climate efforts by serving as a 
communication platform for ministers and negotiators; 
o Engaging over 100,000 people across 16 states and the UK to save 
energy and money through the “Make an Impact” programme. 
Under Claussen's tenure, the programme established the Business 
Environmental Leadership Council (BELC), which is “the largest coalition of 
major U.S. corporations that have agreed that mandatory government 
policies are needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”353 BELC has grown 
from 13 to 32 companies today, which have committed themselves to taking 
measures to combat global climate change. As a member of the U.S. Climate 
Action Partnership, Claussen was also an important part of Pew’s efforts to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions through a government cap-and-trade 
programme. In 2009, the Pew Center was recognized as one of the top non-
profit organizations working on climate change by 139 national climate 
change expert.354  
Success or Failure Factors 
Pew’s work on climate change went through several phases before 
culminating in 2011, and can be interpreted in several different ways. One 
view is that Pew’s work followed a logical progression based on trends in 
public opinion, federal and philanthropic spending, and the regulatory 
landscape.  
Capstick et al. aggregated survey data on climate change, starting with the 
early 1980s. Following an assessment, they identified four general phases of 
awareness surrounding global climate change: (1) 1980s and early 1990s, 
showing increases in knowledge and awareness; (2) mid-1990s to the mid-
2000s, a period marked by growing public concern but also variability in 
opinion; (3) mid- to late-2000s, showing declining public concern and 
increasing scepticism in some nations, with polarization of viewpoints 
within and between nations; and (4) 2010s, which so far suggest possible 
stabilization of public concern about climate change. 355 
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Based on this, Pew began working on climate issues in 1990 when awareness 
and concern about climate change were growing worldwide; it expanded its 
work to a stand-alone centre in 1998 when scepticism was rising, and finally 
discontinued it in 2011 when public concern in the US stabilized. In terms of 
government spending, appropriations for climate change programmes 
remained relatively low from 1998 to 2009, never going beyond 0.6% of 
discretionary spending.356 This increased drastically with the passing of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), which brought 
spending up to 3% discretionary spending.357 A year before this, foundation-
giving for climate change more than tripled in 2008, leaping from $240 
million to $897 million in just one year.358 This was thanks to the Hewlett 
Foundation’s $500 million contribution, which served as seed money for the 
NGO ClimateWorks.359  
Following this narrative, PCT saw an investment opportunity in the early 
1990s to promote a popular and growing concern. When climate change 
became more contested and federal spending remained low, Pew created 
the Center on Global Climate Change, which had a wider reach and broader 
impact. This came at a critical point in time, when strong countervailing 
forces began to emerge. After the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1998, 
climate change became a hugely politicized and contested issue. At this 
point, industries were lobbying against the regulation of greenhouse-gas 
emissions. ExxonMobil spearheaded these efforts by funding research 
groups like the Global Climate Science Team, which directly challenged the 
science behind climate change.360 At the same time, the Global Warming 
Petition Project was circulating among scientists who believed that climate 
change was unfounded and manmade. Pew also created the Business 
Environmental Leadership Council (BELC) at this time, which served as an 
important counterweight to the growing consensus of climate-change 
sceptics.  
After thirteen years of work in the field, PCT defunded climate change, 
confident perhaps that the centre was established enough to work 
independently against the backdrop of stable public concern and elevated 
levels of public and philanthropic spending.  
Alternatively, Pew may have discontinued its work on climate change 
because it had not achieved the large-scale impact it sought. In spite of 
extensive funding efforts, climate change legislation did not pass at the 
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federal level. To date, the US has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol after 
dropping it in 2001, while many federal efforts have faltered. The McCain-
Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act fell through died in a 2005 senate vote; 
the Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act of 2007 failed; the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES) passed in the House but never 
made it to the Senate. There was a brief win in 2007 with the Supreme Court 
ruling that permitted the EPA to regulate carbon emission, but Republicans 
attempted to reverse this in 2011.361 It has been a long and bumpy road, to say 
the least. When hope for federal environmental legislation diminished, PCT 
focused on smaller scale initiatives at the state level, which had proven to be 
a more effect strategy.362  
Today, climate change is regarded as a top global threat by populations 
across the world, particularly in Latin American and Africa.363 However, it 
remains less of a concern to Americans, who rank climate change second-to-
last among seven global threats.364 President Barack Obama has attempted 
to push the agenda forward through such ambitious policies as the Clean 
Power Plan,365 but much work remains to be done. Although Pew ended its 
direct support for climate change in 2011, many other foundations have 
stepped up to the plate. For instance, the Hewlett Foundation and Packard 
Foundation have significantly increased their pledges to climate and are 
calling on other grant-makers to follow suit. Whether or not Pew made the 
right decisions, there is still only less than 2% of philanthropic going towards 
climate change. 
Lessons Learned 
 The political landscape often determines whether or not a 
foundation programme is successful in promoting meaningful 
change, particularly for controversial topics like climate change.  
 Flexibility is paramount when impact largely depends on public 
leaders. 
 While it is important to have ambitious visions, it is equally 
important to refocus priorities when lofty goals are unreachable.  
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Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, USA 
The Tobacco Use Programmes 
Description of Specific Programme 
RWJF’s major tobacco programme was a conglomeration of individual 
projects, including SmokeLess States®: National Tobacco Policy Initiative, 
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, Addressing Tobacco in Managed Care, 
Smoke-Free Families: Innovations to Stop Smoking During and Beyond 
Pregnancy and National Tobacco Cessation Leadership Center.366 A core 
principle of the tobacco use programme was to build on existing efforts 
instead of seeking new approaches to combat the use of tobacco. The goal 
was thus to expand on the health infrastructure and smoke inhibiting 
policies while encouraging smoking cessation. 367  
Origins and Rationale 
Smoking remains the leading cause of preventable death worldwide. In 
addition to taking lives, smoking has cost the US government billions of 
dollars each year on medical costs.368 When the programme began, the US 
was far behind other countries, including England and France, when it came 
to tobacco controls.369 At the same time, groups like the Tobacco Institute 
were releasing studies that downplayed the risks of smoking. Thus, while the 
overall number of smokers had decreased since the mid-1950s, RWJF saw an 
opportunity to further “improve the health and health care of all Americans” 
by contributing to the anti-smoking cause, particularly because no other 
major foundations was working on tobacco-related programming. When 
M.D. Steven Schroeder became directory of the foundation in 1990, he 
convinced the board to begin working on tobacco controls. A focus on teen 
smoking was to become a particular priority.  
Design and Implementation 
Over the lifetime of its tobacco work, RWJF dedicated about 30 major 
projects to combatting tobacco use. It took a multi-step, coalition-based 
strategy, beginning with research programmes on tobacco addiction and the 
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relative effectiveness of state and federal policies on tobacco use prevention. 
Next, it worked together with stakeholders (such as the American Medical 
Association) to build a coalition of supporting organization. This put the 
foundation in a strong position to advocate for stricter state tobacco-
controls. The next phase was a tactical leadership and communications 
strategy involving media campaigns and research dissemination on a 
national and international scale. In the final two phases, RWJF worked on 
promoting effective approaches to smoke-cessation and empowering 
minorities.370 Two years after teen smoking had picked up again (peaking in 
1994), RWJF decided to change its strategy by focusing more strongly on 
research and collaboration. 
Outcome and Impact 
Given that the tobacco use programmes were based on broad coalitions 
working on cumulative projects over the span of about twenty years, it is 
impossible to attribute credit to any one of RWJF’s grants or partners. For this 
reason, the foundation focused its evaluation on its investment levels, its 
contribution strategies, and its leadership style.  
In 2001, the Center for Public Programme Evaluation (CPPE) did an overall 
assessment of the tobacco use programmes. Several reports sought to 
analyse the extent of impact and summarized the efforts of each project. 
According to CPPE, the tobacco use programmes contributed to several 
major achievements, including: 
o A reduction in the portrayal of smoking in movies and on television 
(The PRISM Awards™); 
o Widespread adoption of clean indoor air ordinances in U.S. 
communities (SmokeLess States®: National Tobacco Policy 
Initiative); 
o Funded nearly all states during various times throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s to “support policy and media advocacy efforts to raise 
tobacco taxes, adopt and strengthen smoke-free air policies, and 
implement other policy initiatives.”371 
These efforts correspond with a positive health impact on Americans, 
demonstrated by: 
o A decline in smoking rates among adults from 25.5 percent in 1993 to 
20.6 percent in 2009. 
o A drop in 36 percent in 1997 to 19.5 percent in 2009. 
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o 5.3 million fewer people smoking and 60,000 smoking-related 
deaths avoided by 2010 thanks to smoke-free indoor air policies, 
higher state and federal excise taxes (from 1993 through mid-2009), 
and the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998, all of which RWFJ 
supported. 
Even though the effect was rather indirect, the impact assessment includes 
all the state and federal smoke-restricting laws that were passed between 
1990 and 2009 to create stronger incentives not to smoke via higher excise 
taxes and indoor smoking bans. Two conclusions were that “RWJF’s early and 
continuing leadership was important” and that “synergies among all the 
collaborators were also critical.” 
Thanks to these achievements, the foundation decided to end the 
programme in 2010 and focus on other pressing health challenges, such as 
child obesity. 372 Even so, the foundation admits, “it is not possible to 
categorically attribute or allocate a fair share of the results of their combined 
efforts to RWJF or to any of the leading tobacco-control funders and 
advocates.”373  
Success or Failure Factors 
The rate of cigarette use among adults was already in steady decline as early 
as the mid-1960s, thus the timing of the programme was favourable to 
positive results.374 The pre-existing decline was a result of a combination of 
forces that had contributed to a shift in social norms and a better awareness 
of associated health risks. Other contributing factors were: 
o Grassroots initiatives, such as the first World Conference on 
Smoking OR Health 
o Warning labels on cigarette packaging (implemented in 1965) 
o The emergence of medication/treatments for nicotine addiction 
o NCI’s American Stop Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST) 
o CDC’s Initiative to Mobilize for the Prevention and Control of 
Tobacco Use (IMPACT)  
o Programmes run by states (first by California in 1989) using tobacco 
tax revenues and legal settlements for anti-smoking campaigns 
When RWJF began its tobacco use programmes in 1991, 27.5% of the students 
surveyed had smoked one or more cigarettes during the thirty days prior. 
This number increased steadily until 1997 (reaching 36.4%), after which it 
slowly began decreasing again.375 It was in also in 1997 that RWJF increased 
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its spending on tobacco use programmes by over $20 million. It wasn’t until 
2003, however, that numbers reached levels below the 1991 rates. This was 
also after two years of elevated spending by RWJF in 2001 and 2002, of about 
$100 million and $82 million respectively.376 With positive trends taking hold, 
the foundation began to scale back its tobacco programmes in 2004.After 
the programmes officially ended in 2010, the smoking rate continued to 
decrease among high school students, reaching an all-time low of %15.7 in 
2013. 377  
The evaluation of these programmes has measured the successes of its 
interventions against overall trends that were happening in public opinion, 
legislation, media and health. While this demonstrated that RJWF’s efforts 
did correspond with lower smoking rates, it does not speak to the 
effectiveness of RWJF’s strategy, nor does it reveal whether its intervention 
would have succeeded without these pre-existing trends. For instance, the 
programmes worked best in areas that were already open to change, and 
failed in the most conservative and resistant states. In fact, even today there 
are sixteen states with no restrictions at all on smoking.378 Smoking rates 
also continue to be disproportionately high among American Indian/Alaska 
Natives and lower income people, which was not a particular focus of any of 
the projects.379 This suggests that projects may have partially been designed 
with an “easy win” in mind.  
Finally, an effect of tighter smoking restrictions in the US led to more 
aggressive cigarette campaigns abroad, particularly in third world countries. 
As profits in the US declined, tobacco firms sought markets elsewhere. 
African and Mediterranean countries have even seen upward trends in 
smoking, meaning that tobacco use has not been significantly decreasing on 
a global scale.380 States that have sought to intervene with invasive tobacco 
companies have often been threatened with lawsuits by tobacco firms for 
wanting to interfere in the free market,381 to which poorer countries are 
often powerless. Even though the foundation focuses on the health of 
Americans, it had the indirect effect of exacerbating the health of 
populations abroad. In order to provide a good overall picture of the 
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programme, its unintended consequence should also be included in 
evaluations.  
Lessons Learned 
 Timing plays an important role in the perceived success or failure of 
a programme. 
 Attributing impact is impossible with coalition based approaches 
over long periods, making it difficult for the foundation to critically 
assess its work. 
 The strategy should be evaluated independently of the outcome. 
 Pre-existing trends should be taken into account and unintended 
consequences anticipated when planning programmes. 
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Foundation anstiftung & ertomis, DEU 
Stiftung Interkultur: Intercultural Gardens Movement 
Description of Specific Programme 
The Stiftung Interkultur (intercultural foundation) is a project by the 
foundation anstiftung & ertomis. The project was founded in 2003 and 
serves as a platform to facilitate intercultural community gardening.382 By 
supporting the activities of these gardens, the Stiftung Interkultur hopes to 
create common spaces for environmental education and intercultural 
communication.383 One of the project’s goals is to bring people from 
different backgrounds and countries of origin together. However, at the 
same time, the project does not consider itself an “integration programme” 
but rather a platform to share knowledge and connect expertise. Thus, 
activities of the project are directly related to the practical needs of the 
people working in the gardens. Instead of designing the project from above, 
the staff aims to facilitate incremental but sustainable change by supporting 
the people on the ground to connect and learn from each other.384 The 
foundation invests € 300.000 annually in the project, of which € 100.000 are 
earmarked for small scale grants.385 
Origins and Rationale 
The project Stiftung Interkultur was enabled by two, seemingly unrelated, 
discourses: On the one hand, urban community gardens became increasingly 
popular worldwide. They satisfied the need for fresh produce, but also 
improved whole neighbourhoods and communities. Especially in urban 
centres, they also served as a way to connect to the environment and 
nature.386 On the other hand, debates about migration policies and the 
integration of foreigners reached at that time new highs in Germany.387 
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In 1995, the first “international garden” brought these two issues together. 
Bosnian migrant women, who missed their big gardens at home, started a 
gardening project in Göttingen.388 Over time, Germans and other migrants 
from a wide variety of backgrounds joined the project. The success of this 
garden encouraged other municipalities, churches and non-profit 
organizations to consider similar projects and to contact the organizers in 
Göttingen, asking for help with their own international gardens. The sheer 
number of inquiries overstrained the organizers of the first international 
garden and the foundation anstiftung offered to take on this advisory role.389 
As a result, the Stiftung Interkultur was founded in 2003 to consult and fund 
the growing intercultural garden movement.390  
Design and Implementation 
Overall the project has a low-key approach; it does not aim to force social 
change. One staff member explained: “When people make friends, they 
automatically establish roots somewhere.”391 Based on this idea, the Stiftung 
Interkultur pursues different strategies to support intercultural gardens: 
First, it offers small grants for gardening projects, which can be used to buy 
plants or tools. The money cannot be used to purchase or lease land. Second, 
the project collects and generates valuable information for experienced and 
inexperienced gardeners; it publishes various books and articles on 
migration, gardening and urbanization; and its website gives detailed 
information about the different gardens, best practice examples, and how-to 
tools from beekeeping to toilet composting. Third, the Stiftung Interkultur 
organizes conferences and workshops, which provide networking 
opportunities for members of the gardening community.392 
To foster connections and exchanges between the different gardens, the 
Stiftung Interkultur also serves as the coordinator for the “Intercultural 
Garden Network”. This association brings together different gardening 
projects across Germany and Europe. In addition, the Stiftung Interkultur 
established in 2004 the “Intercultural Gardens Research Network” to 
“explore the social and cultural practices” that were observable in the 
gardens. The members of this network meet once a year to present and 
discuss their research projects.393 
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Outcome and Impact 
The Stiftung Interkultur increased the visibility of the intercultural garden 
movement, which also had political impact. Examples of the movements’ 
impact on policy are illustrated in German and international media 
attention, further contributing to the boom of intercultural gardens. 394 Many 
gardens received prestigious prizes for their work and political recognition 
increased. In 2007, the London Sustainable Development Commission (LSDC) 
chose the international garden in Göttingen as an example for its urban 
policy objectives. 395 The Prince of Wales visited a garden in Berlin and praised 
it as a “model” for integration.396 Local governments embraced the 
gardening movement and began to promote intercultural projects. For 
example, in Berlin the Senate adopted measures which made it easier to 
designate land for gardens and to assist with the purchase of equipment and 
plants.397 
The gardens have a very positive impact on the individual lives of people but 
on whole communities. People from different ethnic, cultural and social 
backgrounds work together and learn from each other - work in these 
gardens is ‘practiced multiculturalism‘.398 For immigrants the gardens serve 
as “safe havens” in an often challenging environment. Many immigrants 
suffer from isolation and the gardens are an effective way to bring people 
out of their homes and together. By growing fruits, herbs and vegetables 
they can also actively add to their daily diet without being reliant on welfare 
or charity.399 The impact is particularly strong for migrant women. In many 
parts of the world gardening is a female activity and, consequently, the share 
of female gardeners is significantly higher in intercultural gardens.400 The 
gardens give them the opportunity to provide for their families, to socialize 
with other women, and to have a sense of belonging.401 Often they bring 
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their children who benefit from the interaction with other people and with 
nature.402 
Furthermore, the gardens have also had a lasting influence on German 
participants. For example in Berlin, Germans plant and harvest side-by-side 
with newcomers to the city. While this improves the German language skills 
of many immigrants, the gardens offer Germans the opportunity to learn 
more about other cultures and religions. 403 Even during the long winter 
months the gardens serve as meeting and educational spaces. Many larger 
gardens offer language and computer classes, lectures and workshops on a 
variety of subjects, activities for children, and even excursions and tours.404 
Overall, the gardens have an important impact on neighbourhoods and 
communities: “Community gardens both require communities and at the 
same time create communities”.405 
Success or Failure Factors 
The Stiftung Interkultur is well known for its research activities and held in 
high esteem by the gardening community. Gardeners across Germany value 
the projects’ expertise and their dedication to the subject. The project staff 
also fosters information and knowledge sharing between different gardens. 
406 In addition, the Stiftung Interkultur benefits from its close relationship 
with the people managing the gardens and its deep knowledge of the 
gardening community. In general, the project staff maintains daily and direct 
contact with garden organizers.407 Instead of acting from above, the Stiftung 
Interkultur aims to learn from those carrying out the work. By these means 
the project management is able to know exactly what their partners need on 
the ground.408 
This approach is particularly successful because immigrants are an integral 
part of this communication process. From the start immigrants are 
integrated into the planning and managing process. Joint activities are the 
basis of the success, not discussions about immigration issues. The project’s 
success is also based on its devotion to diversity. In some gardening projects, 
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people from over 20 different countries work side-by-side. Diversity is 
embraced and desired. To avoid cultural dominance of one particular group, 
the statutes of many gardens contain a diversity clause, which stipulates 
that people from as many different backgrounds as possible should be 
represented.409 
Lessons Learned  
 Cooperation flourishes on an equal footing. Foundations can 
profit as much from the knowledge of their grantees as the 
grantees from the foundation’s support. 
 An indirect approach can be successful. Instead of addressing 
the issue of integration in discussions or debates, the project 
focused on common spaces and shared practical activities to 
bring immigrants and Germans together. It was able to 
successfully bring together two unrelated issues – urban 
gardening and immigration - in a highly creative way. 
 One successful project like the intercultural garden in Göttingen 
can serve as a powerful catalyst for a whole movement. 
Foundations have a role in broadcasting/amplifying what might 
otherwise remain isolated experiments. 
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Walton Family Foundation, USA 
Charter Schools Funding 
Description of Specific Programme 
The Walton Family Foundation started funding charter schools in 1996.410 
The K-12 Education Programme is the foundation’s second biggest 
investment by far; it spent $202.5 Million in 2014 alone, more than its other 
three programmes combined.411 As part of its Education Programme, the 
foundation provides grants to school developers to launch a new charter 
school. As part of its new 2015-2020 strategic plans, the foundation has 
selected 13 target districts that are “both full of need and ready for 
change.”412 
The Public Charter Startup Grant funds grantee organizations who serve low-
income children in one of these districts.413 In order to qualify for the grant, a 
developer must still be in ‘start-up’ mode and be able to draw a majority of 
students from one the foundation’s thirteen target school districts.414 Start-
up mode is defined as being anywhere between 15 months prior to filing a 
charter and the first year of operation. Once the criteria are met, the school is 
eligible for three different types of start-up grants: pre-authorization (up to 
$30,000), post-authorization (up to $220,000), and combination start-up (up 
to $250,000). Pre-authorization is designed to help developers implement 
their planned activities before their charter petition is approved, whereas a 
combination start-up grant is provided within the first year of operation. In 
addition to its start-up grants, the Walton Family Foundation provides 
funding to current grantees and offers additional financial support to the 
charter schools where students demonstrate exemplary performance. Each 
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school is required to track its students’ performance using specific metrics 
and benchmarks.415 
Origins and Rationale 
The Walton Foundation first began working in education in the early 1990s, 
with the belief that the best way of promoting meaningful change was by 
focusing on alternative schools. The early education grants failed to be 
sustainable in the long-term, prompting the foundation to undertake 
research on how to best achieve impact. The foundation concluded that the 
most efficient way to improve K-12 education is to transfer financial control 
from local and state politicians to parents by giving them the choice of which 
school their child attends. Subsequently, the foundation began focusing on 
Charter Schools. 
A charter school is a public school that is unaffiliated with the district board 
of education, in effect making it a one-school district. Educators, parents, 
community leaders, educational entrepreneurs, and others draft a charter 
plan outlining the school's guiding principles, governance structure, and 
accountability measures. If the charter is approved by the state, the school 
receives per-pupil funding. Generally, charter schools operate with increased 
autonomy in exchange for increased accountability driven largely by 
consumer demands for enrolment.416 
After providing direct support to charters, Walton opted to provide indirect 
funding via support organizations. The rationale behind this was a 
worsening political climate; legislators had come under increasing pressure 
by communities to limit and control the growth of charters.417 
Design and Implementation 
The foundation supported Charter schools in two phases. In the first phase, 
the foundation supported a limited number of charter schools to test the 
potential improvement this intervention would yield. The second phase 
spanned across ten years and focused on building the capacity of the 
organizations that support charter schools. It did so in the form of operating 
grants to support research and better media relations, by supporting 
national organizations that assist charter school advocates, and by helping 
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finance the infrastructure.418 This occurred against the backdrop of rising 
charter school opposition. 
Outcome and Impact 
In 2014, the Foundation provided start-up and expansion grants to charter, 
districts, and private schools.419According to Marc Sternberg, director of K-12 
education reform, Walton has given grants to one in every four charter start-
ups in the country, totalling $335 million. As one the largest private 
contributors to education, Walton has been able to exert an immense 
amount of influence on education policy in districts throughout the country. 
For instance, the Charter Schools in Washington D.C. received $1.2 million 
from Walton in direct grants over the span of 12 years and are effectively 
funded by the Foundation. Moreover, the majority of the teachers for these 
schools are alumni of Teach for America, which received the largest amount 
of Funding from Walton. A NYtimes article writes, “With its many tentacles, 
it has helped fuel some of the fastest growing, and most divisive, trends in 
public education — including teacher evaluations based on student test 
scores and publicly funded vouchers for students to attend private 
schools.”420 
Success or Failure Factors 
According to Marc Sternberg, who directs the K-12 education programme, the 
foundation is “deeply committed to the theory of change, which is that we 
have a moral obligation to provide families with high quality choices.”421 
However, the way in which the foundation has implemented its vision has 
been widely criticized and raises numerous questions. Some of the 
underlying factors in critique of the programme are outlined below: 
Although the foundation writes that it focused its grant-making on cities 
that are “full of need and ready for change,”422 it is unclear how and why 
targeted school districts were selected, and why some of the worst 
performing school districts were not included, while relatively good 
performing schools were. Some of the school districts the foundation 
supported had median incomes well above the median household income, 
such as the Douglas County School District in Colorado, which has high 
performing schools and high comparatively high median income. 
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There is mounting evidence that the Charter School reform movement is 
failing. A Fordham University study found that 72% of low-performing 
charters remained in operation and remained low performing in five years.423 
Another study by Stanford University in 2009 concluded that 83 % of 
charters are either worse or no better than traditional public schools. The 
Charter Schools that do perform well very much depend on foundation 
money and their ability to send low-performing schools back to public 
schools.424 Several other studies refute the merits of “pay for performance” 
and standardized testing, which are heavily promoted by the Foundation. A 
2010 Vanderbilt University study demonstrated that merit pay for teachers 
does not produce higher test scores for students; while the National 
Research Council confirmed that standardized test scores do not measure 
student learning adequately.425  
Major international studies on education are conducted every five years. Two 
of these, Progress in International Reading Literacy Study and the Trends in 
International Math and Science Study, examine the factors that contribute 
to school performance. According to these, the most significant indicator 
was poverty (measured by the percent of students in the school eligible for 
free or reduced price lunch). Results from 2011 found that “[i]n comparison to 
the U.S. national average score, 4th-graders in schools in very low to 
moderate poverty (from less than 10 percent to almost 50 percent of 
students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch) scored higher, on average, 
while those in schools with higher proportions of poverty (50 percent to 75 
percent or more of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch) scored 
lower, on average.”426 This suggests that the issue at hand is poverty rather 
than public schools.  
The proliferation of Charter schools has contributed to a two-tier system by 
taking tax dollars and ‘the most motivated families’ away from existing 
public schools. In Washington DC, Walton has ‘steered the direction of public 
education […] for more than a decade.’ As part of this, it supported 
controversial policy change, such as overhauling tenure, implementing 
stricter evaluation systems, and introducing pay for performance in public 
schools. Some of these measures undermine the safeguards of the teacher’s 
unions. The foundation has supported ‘taxpayer funded vouchers for 
students to attend private schools.’  Moreover, the foundation may be 
disproportionately influencing education politics given its size and wealth. 
Members of the Walton family have donated large sums in campaign 
 
423 Stuit, D. (2010). Are Bad Schools Immortal?. Washington DC: Thomas B. Fordham 
Institute. 
424 Ibid. 
425 https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/got-dough-how-billionaires-rule-our-
schools 
426 U.S. Department of Education (20129: Highlights From PIRLS 2011 Reading 
Achievement of U.S. Fourth-Grade Students in an International Context. Washington 
DC: U.S. Department of Education. http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/2013010rev.pdf 
110 
donations to support candidates for local school boards and state 
legislatures who favour their cause.427 
Unlike other foundations that support education, Walton seems to follow a 
distinctly ideological path.428 Although charter schools are by and large a 
bipartisan issue, the starkest critics tend to come from the left.429 The 
foundation disproportionately funds right-leaning think tanks, like the 
Thomas B. Fordham Institute and the American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research (but has also given grants to more moderate organizations, 
like New Leaders for New School). The programme officer behind the charter 
school initiative came from the American Legislative Exchange Council, a 
conservative business-backed group.430 Unbalanced research risks 
overshadowing many of the dissenting opinions, which undermines a full 
perspective on the costs and benefits of alternative schools. 
Moreover, ‘critical in-depth investigations’ are rare.431 This is noteworthy, 
given that Walton is one of the three biggest contributors to K-12 education 
(the other two being Bill and Melinda Gates and the Eli and Edythe Broad), all 
of which support market-based goals for overhauling public education. 
It is evident that the Walton Family Foundation has often fallen under heavy 
critique for seeming to contradict its own mission of “creating opportunity 
so individuals and communities can live better in today's world.”432 The 
family’s fortune comes from the late Sam Walton, who founded Walmart 
stores and Inc., a multinational retail corporation. Walmart’s business-model 
depends heavily on outsourcing jobs, keeping wages low, providing limited 
benefits, and outbidding its competitors due to its size and reach. However, 
rather than investing more strongly in living wages, the Walton Family has 
pursued different philanthropic interests. For instance, in 2011, Alice Walton 
founded the Crystal Bridges Museum,433 which cost the foundation more 
than $1.4 billion.434  
While the foundation is entitled to decide over its charitable giving, this is 
another example of the contradictions between corporations and the stated 
goals of their charitable foundations. 
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Lessons Learned 
 Supporting efforts that indirectly distort public policy leads to 
complicated political entanglements and can undermine the values 
rooted in our democratic system. 
 Philanthropic dollars have a decisive influence on policy areas that 
are usually in the governmental domain and can thus distort and or/ 
undermine public policy.  
 Solving policy problems is complex and requires more than one kind 
of intervention. It is difficult to draw causalities when multiple 
mechanisms are at play, which is the case for low-performing 
schools. 
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William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, USA 
Neighbourhood Improvement Initiative 
Description of Specific Programme 
The Neighbourhood Improvement Initiative (NII) was founded to improve 
the lives of three underserved communities in the Bay Area—West Oakland, 
East Palo Alto, and the Mayfair area of East San Jose. The goal was to 
“achieve tangible improvement for residents and to strengthen the long-
term capacity of the community foundations and neighbourhood 
organizations to sustain change.”435 Three community foundations were 
chosen to serve as managing partners, and over the span of the project, the 
Hewlett foundation committed over $20 million. In order to achieve 
community change, the foundation needed to develop neighbourhood 
leaders, organizations and networks that would support the residents and 
connect them to resources within and outside of the community.436  
NII began with the following goals:437 
o Connect fragmented efforts to address poverty-related issues in 
select communities. 
o Improve the capacity (proficiency and resources) of participating 
community-based organizations. 
o Improve Bay Area community foundations’ capacity to support 
neighbourhood improvement. 
o Develop neighbourhood leaders by creating a vehicle for increasing 
resident involvement in neighbourhood planning and improvement 
strategies. 
o Leverage significant public/private resources to support community 
improvement. 
While there was no articulated theory of change, the foundations believed in 
the overall theory that “improvement in the physical, social, and economic 
conditions in lower-income neighbourhoods will result from the active 
involvement of residents in community planning and decision-making 
processes, in combination with a comprehensive, coordinated, multi-year 
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strategy to address the problems that impair the quality of life in these 
neighbourhoods.”438 
Origins and Rationale 
The long-term goal of the initiative was to “provide long-term statistical 
evidence of changes in poverty indicators (e.g. unemployment, welfare 
dependency, vacant and abandoned structures.”439 It was born from the 
belief that the condition of underserved communities would improve if more 
residents were actively involved in decision-making processes and 
community planning. With the help of a consultant, the foundation selected 
Mayfair (1996), West Oakland (1998) and East Palo Alto (1999) as its three 
sites for investment. These neighbourhoods were selected based on a 
combination of factors that include poverty, failing schools, and substandard 
housing. All three locations varied in terms of demography but had all 
suffered from gentrification due to the dot-com expansion.  
Design and Implementation 
Key Elements to Hewlett’s approach were: 
o Resident engagement 
o The creation of a neighbourhood intermediary 
o Connecting neighbourhood improvement efforts to the larger region 
The basic design of the initiative consisted of six elements: a resident-driven 
process (one year); an implementation phase (per site) supported by grants, 
technical assistance and training that is overseen by a neighbourhood-based 
lead organization (six years); local, cross-sectorial advisory committees; 
partnership with community foundations; data collection and tracking 
system for each site; and a multi-site implementation evaluation.440 
Local community foundations served as partners for the project and were 
responsible for the management of each site. Their work included identifying 
the local lead agency; helping the lead agency implement the 
neighbourhood improvement plan with the help of local residents; and 
managing the advisory committee. The three managing partners for the 
project were the Community Foundation of Silicon Valley (CFSV) in Mayfair, 
the San Francisco Foundation (TSFF) in West Oakland, and the Peninsula 
Community Foundation (PCF) in East Palo Alto. 
A change in leadership at the Hewlett Foundation in 2001 led to a shift from 
a process- to a more result-oriented approach. For this reason, Hewlett used 
an “explicitly outcomes-based framework” starting that same year. Included 
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were “restructuring around a small number of communitywide outcomes, 
cornerstone projects developed to address each one of these targeted 
outcomes, and the development of logic models specifying target 
populations, project outcomes, and performance measures.”441  
Outcome and Impact 
Mayfair 
The “Mayfair Improvement Initiative” (MII) in 1997 and was the first site 
Hewlett used to test comprehensive community improvement, a new 
concept at the time.442 Hewlett chose this site because of its struggle with 
poverty, but also for its history of activism and leadership.443 The two local 
partners - Silicon Community Foundation and the Mexican American 
Community Service Agency (MACS) – were responsible for the planning 
process after which the Mayfair Improvement Initiative began the 
implementation phase.444 
Hewlett’s $6.3 million contribution leveraged $9.6 million in additional funds 
for Mayfair. This made it possible for MII to yield tangible results in terms of 
recreational, cultural and infrastructural improvements, additional social 
housing options, and economic opportunities.445 Families were also 
supported in obtaining health insurance and better preparing their children 
for school. It also improved the level of local education and skills for adults by 
enrolling them in literacy, ESL, and GED classes.446 
MII continued to operate with “substantial credibility and increasing 
capacity” even two years after the initiative formally ended in 2006. Ten 
years after the initiative was formed, it became semi-autonomous from the 
Hewlett Foundation and changed its name to Somos Mayfair “We Are 
Mayfair.”447 
West Oakland 
The West Oakland project took off in 1998 as Hewlett’s second initiative, and 
was called the 7th Street McClymonds Corridor Neighbourhood Improvement 
Initiative. This site proved more problematic than the first and faced 
challenges from the very beginning.  
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Hewlett was not able to find a lead agency for the initiative, and thus asked 
The San Francisco Foundation (TSFF) to serve in this role. After two-and-a-
half years, 7th Street McClymonds Corridor NII starting taking shape, but 
“mistrust of outsiders and factionalism in the community undercut the 
fledgling organization”.448 
The lead agency made a total of 57 grants worth $1.6 million, but there is 
little data on their outcome and impact. The organization was dissolved in 
2001, shortly after the executive director was terminated.449  
East Palo Alto 
The final site in East Palo Alto was launched in 1999. The Peninsula 
Community Foundation (PCF) was the managing partner and One East Palo 
Alto (OEPA) was the local intermediary for the planning process in Palo Alto. 
OEPA helped bring about positive change to jobs, education and crime. 
However, this was only after PCF resigned as managing partner in 2002 due 
to disagreements on “how communities change, what the pace of change 
should be, and how best to develop civil capital.”450 Hewlett took over the 
management, and although it was faced with challenges due to 
inexperienced staff, a high turnover in leadership, and disagreements with 
the OEPA’s board, the initiative brought many positive changes to the 
community. The NII helped create a special task force to reduce crime, 
produced mentoring programmes for at-risk youth, English classes and after 
school programmes. 
Success or Failure Factors 
When the initiative was launched, community change was still a young and 
developing concept. The Hewlett foundation played an important role in 
testing and pioneering new approaches, thereby making significant 
advances in the field. Although the formal assessment of the initiative was 
not complete until ten years later, the experiences on the ground served as 
immediate lessons-learned for other foundations and the future generations 
of community leaders. For instance, funders realized how important it is to 
have a clear theory of change and to focus on results from the beginning. 
Today, investors are more likely to build on existing strengths within 
communities and realistically assess them rather than attempt to implant 
their own ideas and constantly needing to change one's approach to meet 
the demands of those on the ground. Nevertheless, these lessons came with 
a very high price-tag.  
The foundation did not have a detailed theory of change that linked the six 
NII goals, outlined a detailed strategy and addressed the underlying 
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assumptions. 451 Rather, NII’s approach to implementing its theory was 
untested and problematic. For instance, one of the key principles of the 
initiative was the importance of resident involvement, but there were no 
guidelines on how to operationalize this. The only requirement in place was 
that residents make up 51% of the planning group.452 This led to differences 
between Hewlett and its partners on site on how best to leverage the 
support of the community, and also made it more difficult for Hewlett to 
justify its approach. 
Community foundations were beneficial partners for a neighbourhood 
initiative because they already had an established relationship with the 
community, a fundraising capacity, and could continue the work even after 
the project ended. Yet, this was challenging at times because of 
misalignments of goals and expectations, an unclear division or roles, and 
challenging power dynamics.453 The community foundations did not feel that 
Hewlett regarded them “respected partners” and that they had adequate 
support to build their capacities.454 
The neighbourhood intermediaries that were created as new non-profit 
organizations were too inexperienced and lacked a strategic vision. The 
intermediaries were expected to demonstrate results only six years, which in 
hindsight was too ambitious for a start-up organization. 455 
The sites didn’t benefit as much from the efforts to connect the 
neighbourhood to external resources and expertise because there were too 
many internal distractions.456 
Not only did the programme fail to keep up with changes in the community, 
but a change in Hewlett’s leadership in 2001 and the ensuing shift in NII’s 
approach created uncertainty for Hewlett’s partners and stirred unrealistic 
expectations. A new leadership meant changes for the NII process, which 
created new tensions with its partners. Community foundations were 
caught off guard by the sudden changes and felt that it would undermine 
citizen involvement and cause communities to lose momentum.457 The 
community foundations needed time to build the necessary capacity for self-
evaluation and outcome tracking, and the partners had to implement these 
changes while the project was already underway. 
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Lessons Learned  
 Enough time should be allocated to understand that 
organizational culture of partners and to make sure everyone is 
on the same page in terms of goals, strategies and timelines. 
 Partners should be treated as fellow change agents and involved 
early-on so that both sides share a common vision.  
 A framework for evaluation should be established from the 
beginning and be developed with the help of an external 
advisory committee. 
 Local knowledge should be included and results shared for the 
benefit of other communities.  
 The timeframe should be reasonable and realistic in terms of 
deliverables for a project that was built from scratch. It should 
also allow for a change in track if the status quo has proven not 
to work. 
 Transitions should be determined by milestone rather than 
arbitrary dates. 
 The way money is positioned and disbursed is equally if not 
more important than how much money is spent. 
